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INTRODUCTION 
any important terms in our Constitution elude definition. 
Article III, Section 2 is a perfect example. It provides that the 
“judicial Power” of federal courts “shall extend to . . . Cases [and] 
Controversies,”1 but says little more about these words.2 Neither the 
 
1 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (containing a list of nine categories of cases to which “the 
judicial Power [of the United States] shall extend”). 
M 
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Constitution nor the copious notes taken at its Convention offer any 
further definitional insight.3 This silence has sprung the finest 
scholars into well-documented searches for the most accurate 
interpretation of federal judicial power.4 The result has been constant 
competition for theoretical supremacy, but no clear winner.5 
This Article does not announce victory. Nor does it dissect 
competing theories, as the mining of those old warhorses brings us no 
closer to solving the definitional mystery of Article III judicial power. 
 
2 See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and 
Administrative Courts Under Article III, 65 IND. L.J. 233, 265 (1990) (noting that while 
Article III provides the judicial power, “it does not tell us in terms what counts as its 
exercise, nor what participation in its exercise is required in order to constitute the exercise 
of the judicial power by the courts vested with the power”); see also EDWARD S. CORWIN, 
THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 16 (1914) (“[A]s to what that [judicial] power is, 
what are its intrinsic nature and scope, [the Constitution] says not a word.”); Jonathan R. 
Siegel, A Theory of Justiciability, 86 TEX. L. REV. 73, 78 (2007) (“Article III does not 
itself lay out the numerous and detailed rules of justiciability, and these rules are rather a 
lot for the two words ‘cases’ and ‘controversies’ to mean.”). 
3 Richard W. Murphy, Separation of Powers and the Horizontal Force of Precedent, 78 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1075, 1077 (2003); William R. Casto, An Orthodox View of the 
Two-Tier Analysis of Congressional Control Over Federal Jurisdiction, 7 CONST. 
COMMENT. 89, 90 (1990) (noting lack of comprehensive record of Committee of Detail’s 
drafting process for Article III). Of course, this could be because there was no dispute 
among the Framers as to the meaning of these terms. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., 
Congressional Power Over Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Defense of the Neo-Federalist 
Interpretation of Article III, 1997 BYU L. REV. 847, 865; see also 2 MAX FARRAND, THE 
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 430 (rev. ed. 1966) (discussing 
Madison’s notes, which indicated that it was “generally supposed” by the delegates “that 
the jurisdiction given [in Article III] was constructively limited to cases of a Judiciary 
nature”). 
4 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the 
“Judicial Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776–1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990 
(2001); James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, “Some Effectual Power”: The Quantity 
and Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 696, 
771 (1998); Akhil Reed Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 
U. PA. L. REV. 1499 (1990); Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Supreme Court, 
Congress and Federal Jurisdiction, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1990); Robert N. Clinton, A 
Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original 
Understanding of Article III, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 741 (1984). Debates over the Article III 
judicial power inevitably lead to the larger question of the appropriate judicial role in our 
constitutional system, including the proper interpretive methodology courts should employ 
to determine constitutional meaning. See generally, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. 
GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012); JACK M. 
BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011); STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: 
INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE 
AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999). 
5 See generally J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY (2012); 
DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE 
MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS (2002). 
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No single overriding constitutional theory of judicial power has 
captured an entire Supreme Court at one time. Faith in a single theory 
is therefore a gamble before a Court that has known many but loved 
none. 
On occasion, however, the Court has enjoyed long courtships with 
certain Article III doctrines. For instance, a majority of the Court has 
embraced the same general tripartite approach to the standing doctrine 
for nearly forty years,6 even if it has not been defined “with complete 
consistency in all of the various cases decided”7 during this time.8 
Despite throngs of critics,9 the Court has consistently resisted 
invitations to expand or abandon the doctrine.10 A similar doctrinal 
stability characterizes the constitutional barrier to taxpayer standing,11 
and the modern Supreme Court’s treatment of the narrow exception to 
 
6 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–62 (1992) (“[S]tanding 
contains three elements. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury in fact[.]’ . . . 
Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained 
of[.] . . . Third, it must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will 
be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’” (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756 
(1984); Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 43 (1976))). 
7 Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 
454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982). But see Babbit v. Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 297 
(1979) (noting that the boundaries of the “case or controversy” requirement are matters of 
“degree . . . not discernible by any precise test”). 
8 The latest such example might be Clapper v. Amnesty International, 133 S. Ct. 1138 
(2013), wherein the Court split 5-4 on the precise contours of the “actual or imminent” 
principle of an otherwise particularized threatened injury. In Clapper, the Court held that 
attorneys, journalists, and human rights activists lacked standing to challenge 
constitutionality of various surveillance provisions of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008. 
Id. at 1151–52. Clapper appears to add a new wrinkle to this component of standing with 
its insistence that the plaintiffs show surveillance, and thus the injury, was “certainly 
impending.” Id. But the groundwork for such a ruling has existed since City of L.A. v. 
Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983). 
9 Among other pejoratives, the standing doctrine has been called “incoherent,” see, e.g., 
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist 
Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393, 480 (1996); a “jumbled mess,” John A. Ferejohn & 
Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial 
Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1010 (2002); “notoriously inconsistent,” Hein v. 
Freedom from Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587, 619 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(plurality opinion); “a quagmire,” Kathleen C. Engel, Do Cities Have Standing? 
Redressing the Externalities of Predatory Lending, 38 CONN. L. REV. 355, 389 (2006); 
and elitist, Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Standing for Privilege: The Failure of Injury Analysis, 82 
B.U. L. REV. 301, 326–27 (2002) (arguing that the Article III standing doctrine favors 
economically advantaged litigants). 
10 See, e.g., F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 
CORNELL L. REV. 275, 276–77 (2008). 
11 See, e.g., Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). 
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that rule announced in the much-maligned Flast v. Cohen.12 Like the 
larger standing doctrine, the taxpayer version has been battle-tested,13 
but the Court has refused to expand or abandon it since 1968.14 
Doctrinal stability prevailed once again in Arizona Christian 
School Tuition Organization v. Winn,15 wherein the Court rejected 
taxpayer standing to challenge an Arizona law permitting taxpayers to 
claim a tax credit for donations made to school tuition organizations 
that provide scholarships to children attending private religious and 
non-religious schools.16 In Winn, the Court split into three distinct, 
but overlapping, camps. A five-Justice majority held that the 
respondents, Arizona taxpayers, lacked taxpayer standing. The 
majority reasoned that the tax credit program did not involve direct 
expenditure of government funds generated through taxation, but 
 
12 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (establishing a narrow exception to the general rule against 
taxpayer standing for taxpayers raising Establishment Clause challenges to certain 
exercises of congressional power under taxing and spending power of Article I, § 8); see 
infra Part I.B.1. 
13 See, e.g., Hein, 551 U.S. at 623 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“It has often been pointed 
out, and never refuted, that the criteria in Flast’s two-part test are entirely unrelated to the 
purported goal of ensuring that the plaintiff has a sufficient ‘stake in the outcome of the 
controversy . . . .’” (citation omitted)); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 180 
(1974) (Powell, J., concurring) (urging the Court to “lay to rest the approach undertaken in 
Flast”); see also Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1450 (2011) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Cf. Kenneth E. Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court—A 
Functional Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REV. 645, 662 (1973) (explaining that Flast’s two-part 
test “can be understood as an expedient by a court retreating from the absolute barrier of 
Frothingham, but not sure of how far to go and desirous of a formula that would enable it 
to make case by case determinations in the future. By any other standard, however, it is 
untenable.”). 
14 See, e.g., Hein, 551 U.S. at 608–09 (declining to extend Flast exception to challenges 
to executive branch actions funded by unearmarked general appropriations); 
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 347–49 (2006) (declining to expand Flast 
exception to Commerce Clause challenges); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United 
for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 479–81 (1982) (declining to extend 
Flast exception to challenge agency’s decision to transfer surplus federal property to a 
religious institution); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 
(1974) (same; no taxpayer standing to sue under Incompatibility Clause of Article I); 
Richardson, 418 U.S. at 175 (1974) (same; no taxpayer standing under Article I Accounts 
Clause to challenge statute permitting CIA to refrain from accounting for its expenditures); 
Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 486–87 (no taxpayer standing under the Tenth Amendment to 
challenge federal funding programs for reducing maternal and infant mortality). 
15 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011). 
16 Id. at 1447; see also Adam Liptak, Tax Credit is Allowed for Religious Tuition, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 5, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/05/us/05scotus.html?_r=0; Jess 
Bravin, Private-School Tax Break is Upheld, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 2011, http://online.wsj 
.com/article/SB10001424052748703712504576242992744305366.html. 
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instead operated by private choice, pre-government collection.17 
While Justices Scalia and Thomas concurred in this result under the 
Flast test, they also proposed that Flast be overturned, leaving all 
taxpayer (only) plaintiffs outside the doctrine.18 
Justice Kagan’s well written dissent—joined by Justices Ginsburg, 
Breyer, and Sotomayor—predicted the complete demise of the 
taxpayer standing exception.19 All nine Justices, however, reaffirmed 
the “general prohibition on taxpayer standing.”20 All nine also applied 
Flast, and seven fully embraced the Flast exception despite coming to 
different conclusions about its scope and future.21 
While this Article broadly addresses the past, present and future of 
the taxpayer standing doctrine in federal court, it pivots on Winn in a 
direction atypical for most Religion Clause and standing scholars 
because it defends the Court’s decision. Much like Hein v. Freedom 
from Religion Foundation,22 the Court’s decision in Winn has become 
fodder for those displeased with the narrow scope of the taxpayer 
standing exception,23 those numbering Flast’s days24 or already 
mourning its death,25 and those otherwise predicting exactly what 
 
17 Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1447. 
18 Id. at 1450 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Flast is an anomaly in our jurisprudence, 
irreconcilable with the Article III restrictions on federal judicial power that our opinions 
have established. I would repudiate that misguided decision . . . .”). But see id. (noting that 
he was nevertheless joining the Court’s opinion because “respondents lack standing by 
applying Flast rather than distinguishing it away on unprincipled grounds”). 
19 Id. at 1450–63 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
20 Id. at 1451. 
21 See id. at 1440 (majority opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., Scalia, J., 
Thomas, J., and Alito, J.); id. at 1450 (Kagan, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, J., 
Breyer, J. and Sotomayor, J.); see also id. at 1449–50 (Scalia, J., concurring, joined by 
Thomas, J.) (noting that he would repudiate Flast but nevertheless joining the Court’s 
opinion because “respondents lack standing by applying Flast rather than distinguishing it 
away on unprincipled grounds”). 
22 551 U.S. 587 (2007) (plurality opinion) (declining to extend Flast exception to 
challenges to executive branch actions funded by unearmarked general appropriations). 
23 See infra notes 25-27. 
24 See, e.g., William P. Marshall & Gene R. Nichol, Not a Winn-Win: Misconstruing 
Standing and the Establishment Clause, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 215, 216 (2011) (“Although 
not formally overruling Flast, Winn moves significantly in that direction . . . .”); Mark C. 
Rahdert, Forks Taken and Roads Not Taken: Standing to Challenge Faith-Based 
Spending, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1009, 1096–97 (2011) [hereinafter Rahdert, Forks Taken] 
(predicting the demise of Flast). 
25 See, e.g., Mark C. Rahdert, Court Reform and Breathing Space Under the 
Establishment Clause, 87 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 835, 851 (2012) [hereinafter Rahdert, Court 
Reform] (arguing that Hein and Winn create a “no-taxpayer standing rule” as a measure of 
“court reform” to categorically restrict the substantive protections of the Establishment 
Clause). 
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Winn portends for Establishment Clause jurisprudence.26 It would be 
tempting to agree with these pessimistic assessments, pronounce Flast 
dead, and endeavor to completely overhaul the taxpayer standing 
doctrine. But these themes have been examined elsewhere.27 
Furthermore, it is now well-settled that the Court will not permit 
taxpayer standing outside of the facts of Flast, and critics should look 
elsewhere to broaden the doctrine.28 
Alternatively, it might be trendy to insist that the Roberts Court has 
invoked “passive virtues”29 via the standing doctrine to avoid 
deciding Establishment Clause cases because a substantive sea change 
is afoot.30 But I am not convinced that change is coming in either 
 
26 See, e.g., id. at 840–42, 863–65 (speculating that the Supreme Court’s alleged 
elimination of taxpayer standing is a prelude to a major doctrinal departure from its current 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence); Rahdert, Forks Taken, supra note 24, at 1096–97; 
Editorial, Justice Kagan Dissents: A Wrongheaded Supreme Court Ruling Makes it Easier 
for States to Promote Religion, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2011, http://query.nytimes.com/gst 
/fullpage.html?res=9B00E1DC1039F933A25757C0A9679D8B63 (“The [Winn C]ourt’s 
ruling is another cynical sleight of hand, which will reduce access to federal courts while 
advancing endorsement of religion.”); Editorial, High Court Ruling on Arizona Program 
Sets a Bad Precedent, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/apr/07 
/opinion/la-ed-tuition-20110407 (“The decision might seem technical, but it will make it 
harder in the future for taxpayers to challenge programs that breach the wall between 
church and state.”). 
27 See, e.g., supra notes 13; David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: 
1921–1930, 1986 DUKE L.J. 65, 124 (arguing that Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 
(1923), was wrongly decided); Kenneth Culp Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 
U. CHI. L. REV. 601, 632 (1968) (urging the abandonment of the Frothingham rule); Louis 
L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Private Actions, 75 HARV. L. REV. 255 
(1961) (similar). 
28 Cf. Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Limiting Article III Standing to “Accidental” Plaintiffs: 
Lessons from Environmental and Animal Law Cases, 45 GA. L. REV. 1, 8–14 (2010) 
[hereinafter Pushaw, “Accidental” Plaintiffs]. While many scholars have “urge[d] the 
Court to abandon or overhaul the entire [standing] doctrine, . . . stare decisis makes such 
proposals utopian.” Id. at 105. 
29 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 111–98 (1962) 
(tying the “passive virtues” of judicial restraint to the Supreme Court’s perceived 
legitimacy). 
30 See, e.g., Rahdert, Forks Taken, supra note 24, at 1096–97 (arguing that Supreme 
Court’s curtailment of taxpayer standing as a method to usher in “a new version of the 
Establishment Clause that tolerates indirect government financial preference for particular 
faiths, and that treats spending for religious charitable services as part of the government’s 
‘general welfare’ enterprise, subject to the same principles of reciprocity that attach to all 
other forms of pork-barrel politics”); cf. Douglas W. Kmiec, Standing Still—Did the 
Roberts Court Narrow, but Not Overrule, Flast to Allow Time to Re-think Establishment 
Clause Jurisprudence?, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 509, 514 (2008) (“[W]hy not toss Flast now? 
Because, as Mother used to say, ‘The soup is not ready yet.’ . . . The primary benefit of the 
modest decision in Hein is that it gives the Roberts Court an opportunity to re-think the 
underlying religion-clause jurisprudence more carefully.”). 
DEARINGER (DO NOT DELETE) 3/7/14  9:18 AM 
270 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92, 263 
direction. Those who have predicted the relaxation of the standing 
doctrine to facilitate a broader conservative doctrinal agenda are still 
waiting for this shift.31 The merits of Winn provided a safe avenue for 
a standing expansion,32 yet the Court did not take the bait.33 
Regardless, when it comes to Religion Clause cases, we cannot be 
certain; the sample size of Supreme Court decisions in the area is too 
small to conclude that its recent turn to standing34 represents a 
treading of water before the alleged conservative sea change. The fact 
that the Court did not decide a single Religion Clause case during its 
2012 term would indicate, if anything, relative doctrinal stability 
rather than unrest.35 
 
31 See, e.g., Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing at the Crossroads: The Roberts Court in 
Historical Perspective, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 875, 880–81 (2008) (predicting that “an 
increasingly conservative Roberts Court will seek to relax the strictest features of standing 
doctrine to facilitate its broader doctrinal agenda”); Heather Elliott, Standing Lessons: 
What We Can Learn When Conservative Plaintiffs Lose Under Article III Standing 
Doctrine, 87 IND. L.J. 551, 586–87 (2012) [hereinafter Elliott, Standing Lessons] (noting 
health care, stem cell, and gay marriage litigation as potential facilitators of this 
movement). But see Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (2013) (holding that 
official sponsors of California’s “Proposition 8,” the voter-enacted constitutional 
amendment eliminating the right of same-sex couples to marry, lacked Article III standing 
to appeal adverse federal district court ruling when the state refused to do so). 
32 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 655 (2002) (upholding Ohio’s need-
based school voucher program against Establishment Clause attack where “state aid 
reaches religious schools solely as a result of the numerous independent decisions of 
private individuals”); see also id. at 649 (“[O]ur decisions have drawn a consistent 
distinction between government programs that provide aid directly to religious schools and 
programs of true private choice, in which government aid reaches religious schools only as 
a result of the genuine and independent choices of private individuals.” (citations 
omitted)). 
33 See Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1449 (2011) 
(rejecting state taxpayer standing to challenge Arizona law permitting taxpayers to claim a 
tax credit for donations made to private organizations that provide scholarships to students 
at private religious and non-religious schools).  
34 See Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1449; Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587, 
608–09 (2007). 
35 Indeed, the Supreme Court decided only one First Amendment case in its 2012 term. 
In Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society International, Inc., 
133 S. Ct. 2321, 2332 (2013), the Court struck down, on free speech grounds, a 
requirement imposed by the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, 
and Malaria Act of 2003 (22 U.S.C. § 7601) that nongovernmental organizations wishing 
to receive funding from the federal government for HIV and AIDS programs overseas 
adopt a policy explicitly opposing prostitution. The Court granted certiorari to one 
Religion Clause case for its upcoming 2013 term, Galloway v. Town of Greece, which 
concerns a town’s legislative prayer practice at local board meetings. See 681 F.3d 20, 34 
(2d Cir. 2012) (holding that, based on the totality of circumstances—including the process 
by which prayers are selected and the sectarian nature of most of the prayers—a 
reasonable observer would believe the town endorsed a particular religion), cert. granted, 
133 S. Ct. 2388 (May 20, 2013). The Court last addressed this particular issue in Marsh v. 
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Building on that stability, this Article offers a realistic appraisal of 
the taxpayer standing doctrine and what Winn portends for 
Establishment Clause tax credit challenges in the future. Parts I and II 
tell the abridged tales of taxpayer standing’s past and present. While 
this Article concedes that Flast’s “nexuses” test may be fairly 
maligned,36 it contends that Flast should be preserved or rehabilitated 
in a way that advances a normative, conscience-based theory of 
taxpayer standing.37 This approach recognizes government-compelled 
taxing and spending scenarios wherein a taxpayer’s pocketbook harm 
implicates the conscience injury protected by the Establishment 
Clause.38 Part III addresses the future of taxpayer standing. It explains 
why Flast’s normative test dictates the rejection of taxpayer standing 
in Winn, and rebuts Justice Kagan’s substantive arguments to the 
contrary. Specifically, I argue that Justice Kagan exaggerates the 
reach of Winn on a doctrinal level by ignoring the nub of the injury in 
Flast, conflating the legal incidence of tax credits and government 
expenditures, overstating the potential for underenforcement of the 
Establishment Clause, and incorrectly assuming that the Flast 
exception applies to state taxpayers in federal court. 
While the sky is not falling on Flast, dark clouds have formed over 
plaintiffs in tax credit challenges under the Establishment Clause. To 
this end, the Winn dissenters exposed an ominous policy problem 
created by the majority’s conclusion—namely, the fear that 
governments facing Establishment Clause taxpayer challenges may 
now have permission to launder direct financial aid to religion by 
using tax credits in lieu of direct appropriations.39 Their efforts 
provoke further questions, which I explore in Part IV. For example, if 
the taxpayer standing doctrine is impossible to satisfy by individuals 
for whom access to federal court is sufficiently desirable, should the 
doctrine be altered? If so, how? Part IV offers three potential 
solutions: abandoning the rule against taxpayer standing, creating 
 
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), wherein it held that the Nebraska legislature’s practice of 
opening its sessions with a prayer, delivered by a state-employed clergyman, did not 
violate the Establishment Clause. Id. at 793. 
36 See infra Part I.A–B. 
37 See infra Part I.B.1–2. I do not, however, define “conscience” or otherwise attempt to 
delimit which beliefs are worthy of constitutional status. These tasks are not necessary to 
the points advanced in this Article. For an interesting piece that enters the fray, see 
generally Steven D. Smith, Taxes, Conscience, and the Constitution, 23 CONST. 
COMMENT. 365 (2006). 
38 See infra Part I.B.3. 
39 See Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1450–51, 1462–63 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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taxpayer standing by statute, or allowing such actions to be brought in 
an Article I court. I ultimately conclude, however, that none of these 
options are constitutionally permissible or politically viable. 
I 
BACKGROUND: TAXPAYER STANDING’S PAST 
The general Article III standing framework, comprising of three 
elements, has not changed in forty years.40 At an “irreducible 
constitutional minimum,” a proper plaintiff must allege a 
particularized “injury in fact” that is fairly traceable to the action of 
the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial 
decision.41 These standards are easy to recite, as every first-year law 
student will attest. The more difficult exercise is applying them to the 
facts of a given case.42 
This problem is not new.43 For two centuries, concerned and 
disconcerted citizens alike have sued the government for alleged 
violations of the Constitution despite not being directly and 
 
40 See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–62 (1992); Simon v. E. 
Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 43 (1976). 
41 See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61. Furthermore, as a matter of “prudence,” the 
Supreme Court generally refuses to hear cases premised on “generalized grievances” more 
appropriately addressed in the representative branches, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 
499 (1975); the rights of third parties, e.g., Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129 (2004); 
or complaints that do not fall within the “zone of interests” protected or regulated by the 
law invoked, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). See also Elk Grove Unified 
Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11–12 (2004) (explaining that prudential standing, 
while “closely related to Art. III concerns,” embodies “judicially self-imposed limits on 
the exercise of federal jurisdiction”). The prudential standing doctrines are beyond the 
scope of this Article. 
42 See Nancy C. Staudt, Modeling Standing, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 612, 616 (2004) 
(explaining that federal judges must “contemplate the issue in fact-specific contexts and 
appear to defer to the legal rules that directly address the case at hand. Put differently, all 
plaintiffs must prove that they suffered an ‘injury-in-fact,’ but the definition of injury is 
not uniform across plaintiffs with diverse causes of action”). 
43 However, the rise of a detailed methodology for standing, and the fight over its 
foundational underpinnings, is certainly a newer phenomenon. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, 
What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. 
REV. 163, 169 (1992) [hereinafter Sunstein, What’s Standing] (dating the birth of Article 
III standing in the Supreme Court at 1944, in Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288 (1944)); see 
also Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102–04 & n.5 (1998) (finding 
historical support dating back to the nineteenth century for the “triad of injury in fact, 
causation, and redressability” that “constitutes the core of Article III’s case-or-controversy 
requirement” (citing, inter alia, Marye v. Parsons, 114 U.S. 325, 328–30 (1885))). It is 
generally agreed that the concept of standing as a limitation on the federal judicial power 
of Article III originated in a concurring opinion by Justice Frankfurter in Coleman v. 
Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 464–68 (1939). 
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individually deprived of life, liberty, or property in any form or 
fashion. As early as 1792, the Supreme Court took the cue from 
Article III, Section 2 and began demarcating a map of judicially 
redressable controversies as well as the injuries sufficient to create a 
proper plaintiff in federal court—using precursors to the justiciability 
doctrines of standing, ripeness, mootness, and the political question.44 
This narrowing continued apace into the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, at which time—scholars still debate precisely when—the 
standing doctrine cemented itself as the primary constitutional 
prerequisite to suit.45 
 
44 See Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408, 409–10, 1 L.Ed. 436 (1792) (refusing to 
evaluate Revolutionary War veterans’ pension claims of widows and orphans because 
federal courts “cannot be warranted . . . by virtue of that part of the constitution delegating 
Judicial power . . . in exercising . . . any power not in its nature judicial” and suggesting 
that a proper party creates the standing necessary to maintain a lawsuit by the attorney 
general on that party’s behalf); see also Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911) 
(holding that Congress cannot decide the “adverseness of parties prospectively; such 
determinations must be left to the courts”); Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129–30 
(1922) (denying standing to citizens and taxpayers’ general interest in invalidating the 
Nineteenth Amendment); Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937) (per curiam) (holding 
that it is insufficient to allege “merely a general interest common to all members of the 
public”); Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 310 (1944) (“It is only when a complainant 
possesses something more than a general interest in the proper execution of the laws that 
he is in a position to secure judicial intervention. His interest must rise to the dignity of an 
interest personal to him and not possessed by the people generally. Such a claim is of that 
character which constitutionally permits adjudication by courts under their general 
powers.”). 
45 There is much scholarly debate over whether and when standing doctrine became 
entrenched as a constitutional limitation. Compare Ann Woolhander & Caleb Nelson, 
Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689, 718 (2004) (arguing 
that “the nineteenth-century Supreme Court did see standing as a constitutional concern,” 
particularly in lawsuits against federal and state governmental officials), and Steven L. 
Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 
1371, 1420–24 (1988) (noting several nineteenth-century cases using the metaphor 
“standing” to determine whether the plaintiff asserted the kind of substantive interest to 
obtain equitable remedies in court), with Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 9, at 1009 
(contending that the Supreme Court “fabricat[ed] the doctrine[] of standing” in the 
twentieth century), and Sunstein, What’s Standing, supra note 43, at 168–79, 217 (arguing 
that the framers of the Constitution did not intend for Article III to require standing), and 
Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is it a Constitutional Requirement?, 78 
YALE L.J. 816 (1969) (finding no historical basis for the principle that an individualized 
stake by a plaintiff is a requirement of Article III). The truth appears to lie somewhere in 
the middle. See, e.g., James Leonard & Joanne C. Brant, The Half-Open Door: Article III, 
the Injury-in-Fact Rule, and the Framers’ Plan for Federal Courts of Limited Jurisdiction, 
54 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2001) (recognizing that there is little direct evidence in 
support of either side’s argument and concluding that the Founders would have supported 
the injury-in-fact threshold that the Supreme Court has imposed from Article III). This 
Article does not depend on the appropriate answer. 
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A. The Rule Against Taxpayer Standing 
Taxpayers, by no surprise, are among those persons whose interests 
alone do not suffice to confer Article III standing. The Supreme Court 
first explained this in 1923, when it decided Frothingham v. Mellon.46 
Harriet Frothingham sued the Secretary of the Treasury for an 
injunction preventing expenditures under the Maternity Act,47 which 
she claimed exceeded Congress’s general welfare spending power and 
unconstitutionally increased her future tax burden so as to deprive her 
of property without due process of law.48 Her interest was that of a 
disgruntled taxpayer bent on reducing her taxes, which she claimed 
could be accomplished by keeping federal spending down. 
While Ms. Frothingham might have possessed an interest in the 
national fisc along with the taxpaying public, she could particularize 
nothing more. First, she had a causation problem. In dismissing her 
case on Article III standing grounds, the Court concluded that Ms. 
Frothingham’s interest as a taxpayer in the moneys of the federal 
treasury was insufficient because it was “comparatively minute and 
indeterminable[,] and the effect upon future taxation, of any payment 
out of the funds, so remote, fluctuating and uncertain, that no basis is 
afforded for an appeal to the preventive powers of a court of 
equity.”49 She could not seriously argue that the Maternity Act caused 
her offensively high taxes, nor could she insist that enjoining 
spending under the Act would make Congress lower taxes. Congress 
would spend money on what it wanted and, even if it reduced 
Maternity Act expenditures, any corresponding reduction in her future 
taxes would be trivial and untraceable.50 
Second, Ms. Frothingham had a redressability problem. Her 
putative injury was not judicially redressable because even if her suit 
were successful, the only remedy would have been for the Court to 
enjoin the congressional expenditure, not any federal tax itself.51 Such 
 
46 262 U.S. 447 (1923). The Court may have telegraphed its punch a year earlier in 
Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129–30 (1922), where it denied standing to citizens’ 
and taxpayers’ general interest in invalidating the Nineteenth Amendment. 
47 The intent of the Act was to provide financial grants to States with programs for 
reducing maternal and infant mortality. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 449 (1923). 
Ms. Frothingham also argued that the Maternity Act violated the Tenth Amendment. Id. 
48 Id. at 480, 486. 
49 Id. at 487. 
50 Id. at 487–88. 
51 That is to say, her tax liability is obviously not adjudicated in such a suit. See Flast v. 
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 118 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). This is perhaps what the Court in 
Frothingham was arriving at when it lamented the “comparatively minute and 
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a resolution would do nothing to redress her future tax burden. Nor 
would it solve her problems to have the Maternity Act overturned; her 
remedy, rather, was to elect members of Congress who would repeal 
ill-advised laws. In this regard, the separation of powers performed 
the work of standing.52 Ms. Frothingham had asked the Court to annul 
an Act of Congress rather than adjudicate a particularized case or 
controversy. The Court refused to entertain her request, explaining 
that to do otherwise would be “not to decide a judicial controversy, 
but to assume a position of authority over the governmental acts of 
another and coequal department, an authority which plainly we do not 
possess.”53 Permitting such a lawsuit would not only open the 
floodgates to taxpayer lawsuits, it would also engulf the separation of 
powers.54 
Third and most importantly, Ms. Frothingham had an injury 
problem. Ms. Frothingham’s taxpayer interest in enjoining an 
allegedly unconstitutional statute was insufficient to create an Article 
III injury in fact. Her injury was an abstract grievance “shared with 
millions of others,” rather than a particularized injury suffered by 
operation of the Maternity Act.55 The Court noted that a proper 
plaintiff must establish “not only that the statute is invalid[,] but that 
 
indeterminable” effect upon Ms. Frothingham’s future taxation. Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 
487. But not everyone agrees with this casting of Ms. Frothingham’s request. See Richard 
A. Epstein, Standing and Spending—The Role of Legal and Equitable Principles, 4 CHAP. 
L. REV. 1, 33–35 (2001) (arguing that Justice Sutherland placed undue emphasis on the 
idea that Ms. Frothingham was only seeking a tax refund). 
52 Justice Fortas, with agreement from Justices Black and White, noted this much 
during oral argument in Flast. Oral Argument at 16:57, Flast, 392 U.S. 83 (No. 416), 
available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1967/1967_416 (Fortas, J.: “Well, Mr. 
Pfeffer, as I read Frothingham, I would say that it’s based squarely upon separation of 
powers . . . .”). 
53 Id. 
54 Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 488–89. 
55 Id. at 487–88. It is perhaps for this reason that the Supreme Court has, 
notwithstanding its 1968 decision in Flast, described taxpayer standing as a “legal fiction.” 
See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587, 593 (2007) (plurality 
opinion) (“In light of the size of the federal budget, it is a complete fiction to argue that an 
unconstitutional federal expenditure causes an individual federal taxpayer any measurable 
economic harm.”). Of course, Ms. Frothingham would have had standing to challenge the 
collection of a paticular tax assessment as unconstitutional. See, e.g., Follett v. Town of 
McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944) (invalidating tax on preaching on First Amendment 
grounds); see also Hein, 551 U.S. at 599 (explaining that in such a “collection” case, 
“being forced to pay such a tax causes a real and immediate economic injury to the 
individual taxpayer”). But this was not her claim. See Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 480, 486 
(“[Ms. Frothingham’s] contention . . . seems to be that the effect of the [Maternity Act] 
will be to increase the burden of future taxation and thereby take her property without due 
process of law.”). 
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he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct 
injury as the result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers 
in some indefinite way in common with people generally.”56 Were it 
otherwise, every taxpayer offended by a federal statute would have 
the ability to overturn it in court. The Court later elaborated on this 
theme in a case extending the Frothingham rule to state taxpayers,57 
wherein it explained that while taxpayers need not specifically trace 
their tax dollars from relinquishment to government expenditure, they 
must first allege “a good-faith pocketbook action”58 that “as taxpayers 
they are, will, or possibly can be out of pocket because of” the 
challenged government activity.59 
The ruling in Frothingham is decidedly broad. Despite 
protestations,60 the Court has limited the Frothingham holding only 
once, and even then, only slightly.61 By its terms, Frothingham would 
bar suit by federal taxpayers objecting to the spending of their tax 
dollars to support a church or religious institution, notwithstanding 
the Establishment Clause. 
B. The Limited Exception to the Rule Against Taxpayer Standing 
1. The Flast “Nexuses” Test 
Some forty-five years later, in Flast v. Cohen,62 the Court upended 
decades of jurisprudence to establish a very narrow exception to the 
taxpayer standing prohibition in federal court. The Court created this 
exception in Flast despite the fact that Congress had rejected 
legislation that would have authorized taxpayer standing to challenge 
 
56 Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 448. The requirement of a personal injury to a proper 
plaintiff is not new. See, e.g., Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937) (per curiam); 
Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129 (1922); cf. Tyler v. Judges of the Court of 
Registration, 179 U.S. 405, 406 (1900) (adjoining landowner cannot assert his neighbor’s 
potential property deprivation; rather, he must “aver an injury peculiar to himself, as 
distinguished from the great body of his fellow citizens”). 
57 Doremus v. Bd. of Educ. of Hawthorne, 342 U.S. 429 (1952). Doremus involved a 
state law requiring “the reading, without comment, of five verses of the Old Testament at 
the opening of each public-school day.” Id. at 430. The plaintiffs challenged the statute in 
their capacity as “citizens” and “taxpayers.” Id. at 431. 
58 Id. at 434. 
59 Id. at 433. 
60 See, e.g., Hearings on S. 2097 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the 
S. Judiciary Comm., 89th Cong. 465–98 (1966); Currie, supra note 27, at 124; Culp Davis, 
supra note 27, at 632. 
61 See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
62 Id. 
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the very statute in question: the Elementary and Secondary Education 
Act of 1965.63 The plaintiffs in Flast asked the Court to enjoin the 
expenditure of federal funds under the Act because that money was 
allegedly being used to support religious schools in violation of the 
First Amendment.64 Specifically, the “claim [wa]s that the plaintiffs’ 
money [wa]s being used in an official [government] program which 
[wa]s being conducted” in violation of the Establishment Clause.65 
The obvious question presented was whether the plaintiffs, suing 
solely in their capacity as federal taxpayers, had standing to raise this 
constitutional challenge.66 
Writing for the Flast Court, Chief Justice Warren explained that 
the answer turned on whether the plaintiffs could “demonstrate the 
necessary stake as taxpayers in the outcome of the litigation to satisfy 
Article III requirements.”67 The Chief Justice was not clear, however, 
on what comprised the proper stake—indeed, his language appears to 
restate the question rather than answer it.68 While underscoring that 
 
63 At the committee levels in both the House and Senate, Congress considered 
amendments to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act that would have authorized 
such challenges. See 111 CONG. REC. H5771 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1965), H5942-43 (daily 
ed. Mar. 25, 1965) (rejected by House); 111 CONG. REC. S7345 (daily ed. Apr. 7, 1965) 
(rejected by Senate); 111 CONG. REC. H5973 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 1965), H6132 (daily ed. 
Mar. 26, 1965), S7316-18 (daily ed. Apr. 7, 1965) (debate on the topic). 
64 Flast, 392 U.S. at 85 (“In this case, we must decide whether the Frothingham barrier 
should be lowered when a taxpayer attacks a federal statute on the ground that it violates 
the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment.”). The funds in 
Flast, totaling in the millions, were used to support several education programs, including 
but not limited to “instruction in reading, arithmetic, and other subjects in religious 
schools, and to purchase textbooks and other instructional materials for use in such 
schools.” Id. at 85–86. The plaintiffs in Flast sued to have portions of the Act authorizing 
those expenditures declared unconstitutional and to enjoin any future expenditures. Id. at 
85. They attempted to distinguish Frothingham on the basis that it established a rule of 
judicial self-restraint or abstention rather than a jurisdictional limitation under Article III, § 
2, and thus had no application to the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. See Flast v. 
Gardner, 271 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), rev’d, Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
65 Flast, 271 F. Supp. at 8 (Frankel, J., dissenting). 
66 In Flast, the district court answered this question in the negative. Id. Judge Frankel, 
the lone dissenter, would have found standing based on the rule that “the Establishment 
Clause forbids the use of tax money” by the government “to support any religion.” Id. at 6. 
The Supreme Court ultimately embraced this conclusion. Flast, 392 U.S. at 106. 
67 Flast, 392 U.S. at 102. 
68 That is, taxpayer plaintiffs have standing if they have standing. See id. But see Valley 
Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 
464, 485–86 (1982) (“‘[T]hat concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of 
issues’ . . . is the anticipated consequence of proceedings commenced by one who has 
been injured in fact; it is not a permissible substitute for the showing of injury itself.” 
(emphasis added) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 396 U.S. at 186, 204 (1962))). 
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Article III standing will not be satisfied “where a taxpayer seeks to 
employ a federal court as a forum in which to air his generalized 
grievances about the conduct of government or the allocation of 
power in the Federal System,” the Warren Court carved out an 
exception for what it determined was a distinct personal injury with a 
legal remedy available to redress it.69 In an eight-to-one decision, the 
Court held that because a federal taxpayer can allege injury only 
when “his tax money is . . . extracted and spent,”70 such an injured 
taxpayer “will have standing consistent with Article III to invoke 
federal judicial power when he alleges that congressional action under 
the taxing and spending clause is in derogation of those constitutional 
 
 There are other problems with the Court’s opinion in Flast. At times, the Court appears 
to conclude that the purpose of standing is merely to enable the Court to perform its work 
accurately, rather than to prevent interference with issues committed to the other branches 
of government. See Flast, 392 U.S. at 99–101 (noting that because standing focuses on the 
parties and not the issues of the case, the proper plaintiff question “does not, by its own 
force, raise separation of powers problems related to improper judicial interference in 
areas committed to other branches of the Federal Government”). This rationale has been 
thoroughly discredited by the Supreme Court itself. See, e.g., Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 
1, 11–12 (1998) (concluding that Flast failed to recognize the separation of powers aspects 
of Article III standing); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (resting standing upon 
the “single . . . idea” of separation of powers). But see Berger, supra note 45, at 827–29 
(arguing that standing has nothing to do with separation of powers). Furthermore, despite 
implying that the issues presented were irrelevant to the standing inquiry, Chief Justice 
Warren asserted that the issues could nevertheless be analyzed to ascertain whether the 
requisite “nexus” was present. See Flast, 392 U.S. at 102. Thus, in discounting issues and 
their obvious connection to the separation of powers, the Court may have simply been 
underscoring that the taxpayer’s interest must be personal, not that it must be completely 
different from those shared by any other taxpayer. 
69 Flast, 392 U.S. at 106. Chief Justice Warren’s majority opinion was unclear as to 
whether the Frothingham rule against taxpayer standing was based on constitutional or 
prudential grounds. Compare id. at 102 (explaining that the question of whether plaintiffs 
may sue based solely on their capacity as taxpayers “turns on whether they can 
demonstrate the necessary stake as taxpayers in the outcome of the litigation to satisfy 
Article III requirements” (emphasis added)), with id. at 105–06 (holding that “a taxpayer 
will have standing consistent with Article III to invoke federal judicial power when he 
alleges that congressional action under the taxing and spending clause is in derogation of 
those constitutional provisions which operate to restrict the exercise of the taxing and 
spending power” (emphasis added)). Any lingering doubt on this issue appears to have 
been cleared up in United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974), and, most recently, 
Arizona Christian School Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011). See Richardson, 
418 U.S. at 172–73 (recognizing that Frothingham rule standing derived from the 
requirements of Article III, not prudential concerns). Indeed, the majority’s opinion in 
Winn references the requirement and “foundational role” of Article III standing no fewer 
than nine times. 131 S. Ct. at 1440, 1441, 1442, 1443, 1449. Of course, if the rule against 
federal taxpayer standing derives from Article III, its exception cannot be based solely on 
judicial prudence. 
70 See Flast, 392 U.S. at 106. 
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provisions which operate to restrict the exercise of the taxing and 
spending power.”71 The Flast “nexuses” test thus requires an injured 
taxpayer plaintiff to first establish a “logical link between [his 
taxpayer] status and the type of legislative enactment attacked,” and 
second, establish “a nexus between that status and the precise nature 
of the constitutional infringement alleged.”72 
The precise constitutional infringement that the Flast Court had in 
mind was the freedom of conscience protected by the Establishment 
Clause.73 The Court treated that Clause as a specific bulwark against 
Congress’s use of the taxing and spending power “to favor one 
religion over another or to support religion in general.”74 Invoking 
James Madison’s famous Memorial and Remonstrance Against 
Religious Assessments75 and channeling the “Jeffersonian 
proposition” against compelled exactions,76 the Court considered the 
Clause sufficiently implicated by any law that would “force a citizen 
 
71 Id. at 105–06. The Supreme Court’s complete holding in Flast reads as follows: 
[W]e hold that a taxpayer will have standing consistent with Article III to invoke 
federal judicial power when he alleges that congressional action under the taxing 
and spending clause is in derogation of those constitutional provisions which 
operate to restrict the exercise of the taxing and spending power. The taxpayer’s 
allegation in such cases would be that his tax money is being extracted and spent 
in violation of specific constitutional protections against such abuses of 
legislative power. Such an injury is appropriate for judicial redress, and the 
taxpayer has established the necessary nexus between his status and the nature of 
the allegedly unconstitutional action to support his claim of standing to secure 
judicial review. 
Id. 
72 Id. at 102–03. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 103 (“Our history vividly illustrates that one of the specific evils feared by 
those who drafted the Establishment Clause and fought for its adoption was that the taxing 
and spending power would be used to favor one religion over another or to support 
religion in general.”). “The Establishment Clause was designed as a specific bulwark 
against such potential abuses of governmental power” and, as such, “operates as a specific 
constitutional limitation upon the exercise by Congress of the taxing and spending power 
conferred by Art. I, § 8.” Id. at 104; see id. at 115 (Fortas, J., concurring) (“In terms of the 
structure and basic philosophy of our constitutional government, it would be difficult to 
point to any issue that has a more intimate, pervasive, and fundamental impact upon the 
life of the taxpayer—and upon the life of all citizens.”). 
75 JAMES MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in 2 
THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901). 
76 “[T]o compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of 
opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical . . . .” Thomas Jefferson, Bill for 
Establishing Religious Freedom, in THE SUPREME COURT ON CHURCH AND STATE 25, 25 
(Robert S. Alley ed., 1988). Professor Steven Smith is credited for coining the phrase 
“Jeffersonian proposition.” See Smith, supra note 37, at 374. 
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to contribute three pence . . . of his property for the support of any one 
establishment.”77 Indeed, such support to religion “by the use of 
taxpayers’ money lay at the heart of Jefferson’s and Madison’s 
concern”78 regarding the rights of conscience later enshrined in the 
Religion Clauses.79 This fact was unanimously recognized twenty 
years prior in Everson v. Board of Education,80 which held that the 
 
77 Flast, 392 U.S. at 103 (quoting JAMES MADISON, supra note 75, at 186) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). See also Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 11 
(“The imposition of taxes to pay ministers’ salaries and to build and maintain churches and 
church property aroused [the Framers’] indignation. It was these feelings which found 
expression in the First Amendment.”); NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD 48 (2005) 
(“The advocates of a constitutional ban on establishment were concerned about paying 
taxes to support religious purposes that their consciences told them not to support.”). Not 
everyone agrees, however, that Madison’s “three pence” concern applies to Establishment 
Clause harm. See, e.g., Kyle Duncan, Misunderstanding Freedom from Religion: Two 
Cents on Madison’s Three Pence, 9 NEV. L.J. 32, 49–55 (2008) (arguing that Madison’s 
claim is more grounded in the Free Exercise Clause than the Establishment Clause). 
[W]hen we translate Madison’s “three pence” argument into modern doctrinal 
categories, it fails to support an exception to the ban on generalized taxpayer 
standing. . . . Instead, the argument was Madison’s effective way of dramatizing 
the harm to free exercise rights of those whose religious relationships the 
assessment threatened to corrupt. 
Id. at 53. This fact, however, should not detract from the conscience harm, which is 
recognized by both Clauses. René Reyes, Justice Souter’s Religion Clause Jurisprudence: 
Judgments of Conscience, 43 CONN. L. REV. 303, 319 (2010). 
78 See Flast v. Gardner, 271 F. Supp. 1, 7 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (Frankel, J., dissenting), 
rev’d, Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 (1968) (adopting Judge Frankel’s standing 
conclusion); see also Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 722 (2004) (“Since the founding of 
our country, there have been popular uprisings against procuring taxpayer funds to support 
church leaders, which was one of the hallmarks of an ‘established’ religion.”). Indeed, 
some have argued that the principle of liberty of conscience can be traced back to the 
Greek and Roman Stoics. See Martha Nussbaum, John F. Scarpa Conference on Law, 
Politics, and Culture: Reply, 54 VILL. L. REV. 677, 699–700 (2009). 
79 See JAMES MADISON, supra note 75, at 186 (describing the rights of conscience as 
providing that “[t]he Religion . . . of every man must be left to the conviction and 
conscience of every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it as these may 
dictate”); see also Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 711 n.22 (2002) (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (“As a historical matter, the protection of liberty of conscience may well have 
been the central objective served by the Establishment Clause.”); Noah Feldman, The 
Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 346, 351 (2002) 
(“Establishment of religion, the Framers’ generation thought, often had the effect of 
compelling conscience. [T]he Framers’ generation worried that conscience would be 
violated if citizens were required to pay taxes to support religious institutions with whose 
beliefs they disagreed.”). But see Richard W. Garnett, Standing, Spending, and 
Separation: How the No-Establishment Rule Does (and Does Not) Protect Conscience, 54 
VILL. L. REV. 655, 664 (2009) (rejecting the argument that government support of religion 
violates a taxpayer’s rights of conscience). 
80 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Everson unanimously stated the governing substantive principles 
of the Establishment Clause as it pertains to taxation as follows: “No tax in any amount, 
large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever 
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First Amendment forbade government support of churches through 
the exaction of taxes and tithes.81 
According to the Flast Court, the plaintiffs met the so-called 
“nexuses” test because they challenged Congress’s exercise of power 
to tax and spend for the general welfare—i.e., the “challenged 
program involve[d] a substantial expenditure of federal tax funds,” 
and the taxpayer plaintiffs “alleged that the challenged expenditures 
violate[d] the Establishment . . . Clause[].”82 The Court viewed the 
Clause as a specific limitation on the federal power to tax and spend 
because it prevented Congress from using such powers to aid a 
particular religion or religion in general.83 This specific, non-Article I 
limitation on Congress’s taxing and spending power established the 
appropriate “nexuses” between the federal taxpayers’ status (prong 
one) and the nature of the allegedly unconstitutional action (prong 
two) to support their claim of standing to secure judicial review.84 
 
they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.” Id. at 
511–12. 
81 See id. at 32–45, 63–72 (appending JAMES MADISON, supra note 75, at 186); see 
also Flast, 271 F. Supp. at 9. 
82 Flast, 392 U.S. at 103. The Court specifically avoided the question of “whether the 
Free Exercise claim, standing alone, would be adequate to confer standing” in the case, 
having already found the Establishment Clause claim sufficient to establish the requisite 
nexus. Id. at 104 n.25. 
83 Id. at 102–03. Although the terms of the Establishment Clause arguably impose no 
greater limit on the taxing and spending power than other structural constitutional 
limitations, time has proven the Flast exception to be an Establishment Clause exception 
and nothing more. “[N]o claim on the merits other than one brought under the 
Establishment Clause has ever been permitted in a federal court by a plaintiff asserting 
taxpayer standing.” Carl H. Esbeck, What the Hein Decision Can Tell Us About the 
Roberts Court and the Establishment Clause, 78 MISS. L.J. 199, 211 (2008); see, e.g., 
Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587, 642 n.4 (2007) (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (plurality opinion) (conceding that “[o]utside the Establishment Clause 
context, . . . we have not found the injury to a taxpayer when funds are improperly 
expended to suffice for standing”). 
84 Flast, 392 U.S. at 105–06. Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court 
fe[lt] confident that the questions will be framed with the necessary specificity, 
that the issues will be contested with the necessary adverseness and that the 
litigation will be pursued with the necessary vigor to assure that the 
constitutional challenge will be made in a form traditionally thought to be 
capable of judicial resolution. 
Id. at 106. It specifically distinguished this sentiment with its conclusion in Frothingham, 
where a federal taxpayer sought “to employ a federal court as a forum in which to air his 
generalized grievances about the conduct of government or the allocation of power in the 
Federal System.” Id. 
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2. Justice Harlan’s Dissent 
Justice Harlan dissented vigorously in Flast, believing that the 
majority’s “nexuses” test rested on premises that could not withstand 
analysis.85 In addition to critiquing virtually every aspect of Chief 
Justice Warren’s majority opinion, Justice Harlan provided several 
thoughts on the substantive rights of taxpayer plaintiffs.86 Borrowing 
Professor Louis Jaffe’s use of the terms “Hohfeldian” and “non-
Hohfeldian,”87 Justice Harlan distinguished the interests of taxpayers, 
who contest the constitutionality of public expenditures (“non-
Hohfeldian” plaintiffs who claimed no injury to a personal legal right) 
from the “Hohfeldian” taxpayer plaintiffs, who can connect the same 
challenge to the validity of their individual tax liabilities.88 The non-
Hohfeldian plaintiffs’ interests in the expenditure of public funds was 
no different from those of the general public, and certainly did not 
exist by virtue of “any special rights retained by them in their tax 
payments.”89 The Flast plaintiffs were, in Justice Harlan’s opinion, 
non-Hohfeldian litigants “challeng[ing] an expenditure,” but “not a 
tax.”90 Granting standing for such action would not only “strain the 
judicial function and press to the limit judicial authority,” it “might 
well alter the allocation of authority among the three branches of the 
Federal Government.”91 
 
85 Id. at 116–17 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Although I . . . agree with certain of the 
conclusions reached today by the Court, I cannot accept the standing doctrine that it 
substitutes for Frothingham . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
86 Indeed, while Justice Harlan considered the standing issues presented in Flast 
“narrow and relatively abstract,” he believed that “the principles by which they must be 
resolved involve nothing less than the proper functioning of the federal courts, and so run 
to the roots of our constitutional system.” Id. at 117. 
87 Louis L. Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or 
Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033 (1968) (citing Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, 
Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 
(1913)). 
88 Flast, 392 U.S. at 119–20 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“We must recognize that these 
non-Hohfeldian plaintiffs complain, just as the petitioner in Frothingham sought to 
complain, not as taxpayers, but as ‘private attorneys-general.’ The interests they represent, 
and the rights they espouse, are bereft of any personal or proprietary coloration. They are, 
as litigants, indistinguishable from any group selected at random from among the general 
population, taxpayers and nontaxpayers alike.” (footnote omitted)). 
89 Id. at 118 (“The simple fact is that no such rights can sensibly be said to exist.”). 
90 Id. at 128 (“If this case involved a tax specifically designed for the support of 
religion, as was the Virginia tax opposed by Madison in his Memorial and Remonstrance, 
I would agree that taxpayers have rights under the religious clauses of the First 
Amendment that would permit them standing to challenge the tax’s validity in the federal 
courts.” (footnote omitted)). 
91 Id. at 130. 
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Criticizing the Chief Justice’s stated rationale, Justice Harlan 
further observed that if the requisite “personal stake in the outcome” 
is the heart of Article III standing,92 mechanical application of Flast’s 
two-part nexuses test does little to further that principle. First, Justice 
Harlan argues that a taxpayer plaintiff’s personal incentive to 
challenge a governmental expenditure has everything to do with 
government expenditure vel non and nothing to do with “the type of 
legislative enactment attacked.”93 Second, Justice Harlan points out 
the intensity of a taxpayer plaintiff’s personal interest in his lawsuit is 
wholly unrelated to the importance that others place on the 
constitutional provision under which the taxpayer brings his 
challenge,94 or whether that provision constitutes a “specific 
limitation” upon Congress’s spending powers.95 “The difficulty, with 
which the Court never comes to grips,” according to Justice Harlan, 
“is that taxpayers’ suits under the Establishment Clause are not in 
these circumstances meaningfully different from other public 
actions,” where no special standing exception exists.96 In this 
instance, the Court made no real connection between a taxpayer’s 
status and the stake he has in Establishment Clause issues. To Justice 
 
92 It was at the time and remains so today. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 
(1962); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007) (“At bottom, ‘the gist of the 
question of standing’ is whether petitioners have ‘such a personal stake in the outcome of 
the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of 
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination.’” (quoting Baker, 369 
U.S. at 204)). 
93 Flast, 392 U.S. at 102, 122–23 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
94 Id. at 124 (“I am quite unable to understand how, if a taxpayer believes that a given 
public expenditure is unconstitutional, and if he seeks to vindicate that belief in a federal 
court, his interest in the suit can be said necessarily to vary according to the constitutional 
provision under which he states his claim.”). 
95 Id. at 123–27. 
 The Court’s position is equally precarious if it is assumed that its premise is 
that the Establishment Clause is in some uncertain fashion a more “specific” 
limitation upon Congress’ powers than are the various other constitutional 
commands. . . . [O]nly in some Pickwickian sense are any of the provisions with 
which the Court is concerned “specific(ally)” limitations upon spending, for they 
contain nothing that is expressly directed at the expenditure of public funds. . . . 
 Even if it is assumed that such distinctions may properly be drawn, it does not 
follow that federal taxpayers hold any “personal constitutional right” such that 
they may each contest the validity under the Establishment Clause of all federal 
expenditures. 
Id. at 127–28. 
96 Id. at 128. 
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Harlan, the Court’s new taxpayer standing exception test and the 
criteria for meeting it were entirely unrelated.97 
3. Flast’s Normative Test 
Judges, litigants, and scholars routinely misinterpret Flast by 
treating satisfaction of its “nexuses” test as the harm itself—i.e., that a 
logical nexus between the taxpayer status asserted and the claim 
adjudicated satisfies the exception.98 Under this theory, every 
taxpayer has standing to challenge any government exercise of taxing 
or spending power that the plaintiff alleges violates the Establishment 
Clause.99 All taxpayers are the same. As a result, merely restating the 
elements of the “nexuses” test allows a citizen to litigate his desire 
that the government act in a constitutional manner with regard to 
religion. 
This elevates form over substance. Flast presumes an injured 
taxpayer and his funds as the object of harm. It requires taxpayer 
plaintiffs stirred by an otherwise generalized grievance to make a 
showing that the type of taxing and spending action they object to 
takes from them to spend on religion. The taxpayer’s injury in such a 
case, as the Court explained, “would be that his tax money is being 
extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protections 
 
97 Id. at 121. It is important to note, however, that Justice Harlan did not level this same 
critique of the Flast majority’s holding that a taxpayer plaintiff be required to show “that 
his tax money is being extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional 
protections against such abuses of legislative power” in order to fit within the exception. 
See id. at 106 (emphasis added). Nor did Justice Harlan view the absence of a broader 
exception as a threat to future enforcement of the Religion Clauses. See id. at 133 (“The 
recent history of this Court is replete with illustrations, . . . that questions involving the 
religious clauses will not, if federal taxpayers are prevented from contesting federal 
expenditures, be left ‘unacknowledged, unresolved, and undecided.’”); see also infra Part 
III.B.3. 
98 See, e.g., Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1450–63 (2011) 
(Kagan, J., dissenting); Meredith L. Edwards, Constitutional Law—Taxpayer Standing to 
Challenge Executive Spending—Discretionary Spending Versus Spending Pursuant to 
Congressional Authority, 77 MISS. L.J. 695, 700–02 (2007); Eric J. Segall, Standing 
Between the Court and the Commentators: A Necessity Rationale for Public Actions, 54 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 351, 364 (1993); Bradley Thomas Wilders, Standing on Hallowed Ground: 
Should the Federal Judiciary Monitor Executive Violations of the Establishment Clause?, 
71 MO. L. REV. 1199, 1205–06 (2006). 
99 See, e.g., Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1450–51 (Kagan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan’s 
dissent in Flast specifically distinguished public actions from the majority’s newfound 
standing exception, noting that while such a rule could have been applied to the case, it 
was never authorized by Congress. See Flast, 392 U.S. at 133 & n.23 (Harlan, J., 
dissenting). 
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against such abuses of legislative power.”100 Only taxpayers suffering 
such an injury can then benefit from the “nexuses” test. 
The requisite harm is not merely the taxpayer’s psychological 
displeasure of a possible violation of the Establishment Clause.101 
Nor is it the direct financial injury in the form of taxpayer money 
spent by the government.102 Rather, it is both of these harms.103 A 
better reading of Flast recognizes the narrow exception reserved for 
situations when a taxpayer’s pocketbook harm implicates his 
conscience rights in a way that particularizes his personal stake as one 
who is compelled by the government to relinquish the protections 
afforded by the Establishment Clause. 
The taxpayer-plaintiff’s funds as the object of harm—however 
small104—are the starting point to any normative understanding of the 
Flast exception. Without the extraction of those funds, he suffers no 
pocketbook injury. With no pocketbook injury, the government has 
no revenue to spend and thus the taxpayer’s rights of conscience 
cannot be directly implicated by that spending. Under such 
circumstances, the taxpayer lacks a sufficient “stake in the outcome of 
 
100 Flast, 392 U.S. at 106 (emphasis added); see also DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 
547 U.S. 332, 348 (2006) (“The Court [in Flast] therefore understood the ‘injury’ alleged 
in Establishment Clause challenges to federal spending to be the very ‘extract[ion] and 
spen[ding]’ of ‘tax money’ in aid of religion alleged by a plaintiff.”). It cannot be 
overlooked that the Court in Flast required an exercise of both the taxing and spending 
power of Article I, Section 8. Flast, 392 U.S. at 102. The Court repeated these powers, 
using the conjunctive, a dozen times in Flast, and provided examples of how one power 
would be insufficient standing alone. See id. at 102, 105–06. The Court’s “extract and 
spend” injury no doubt played a role in its language here: “The taxpayer’s allegation in 
such cases would be that his [or her] tax money is being extracted and spent in violation of 
specific constitutional protections against such abuses of legislative power.” Id. at 106 
(emphasis added). 
101 It is well settled that a taxpayer’s psychological interest in having the government 
act constitutionally is insufficient to confer standing. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian 
Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. at 497–98 & n.20 
(rejecting “the concept of taxpayer injury necessarily recognizes the continuing stake of 
the taxpayer in the disposition of the Treasury to which he has contributed his taxes, and 
his right to have those funds put to lawful uses”); Doremus v. Bd. of Educ. of Hawthorne, 
342 U.S. 429 (1952); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923); Fairchild v. 
Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129 (1922). 
102 Cf. Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 488. 
103 But see Micah Schwartzman, Conscience, Speech, and Money, 97 VA. L. REV. 317, 
372–76 (2011) (pursuing argument that taxpayers who assert an Establishment Clause 
violation confuse their money with their conscience). 
104 See Flast, 392 U.S. at 103 (“[T]he same authority which can force a citizen to 
contribute three pence only of his property for the support of any one establishment, may 
force him to conform to any other establishment in all cases whatsoever.” (quoting JAMES 
MADISON, supra note 75, at 186)). 
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the controversy” under the Establishment Clause. This is because, as 
explained above, the Clause’s conscience injury—the ending point of 
harm—is the unwilling contributor’s compelled support of the very 
thing that the Clause was designed to protect against.105 Because the 
right protected under the Establishment Clause makes it a cognizable 
“‘injury’ to have one’s money taken and used for the proscribed 
purpose,”106 the taxpayer plaintiff must connect his status directly to 
such an injury. 
Though the Supreme Court has never expressly stated it, Flast is 
proof that harm to one’s conscience must be coupled with financial 
harm to show a sufficient injury for taxpayer standing purposes. 
Indeed, even those who espouse the more expansive view of the 
taxpayer standing exception agree that, to set forth an injury under 
Flast, the constitutional “right of conscience and the expenditure of 
an identifiable three pence raised by taxes for the support of a 
religious cause” cannot be “split off from one another.”107 The nature 
of the assessment is more than cumulative;108 there must also be a 
connection between the two. As Justice Souter has explained, “[t]he 
three pence implicates the conscience,” making the harm from 
government expenditures on religion more than a mere “‘Psychic 
Injury’ that results whenever a congressional appropriation . . . raises 
hackles of disagreement with the policy supported.”109 And contrary 
to Justice Scalia’s biopic position on taxpayer harm, the type of injury 
explicitly recognized as sufficient by Flast connects a taxpayer’s 
pocketbook with his psyche when “his tax money is being extracted 
 
105 See supra notes 73–79 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Nussbaum, supra note 
78, at 701. 
106 Flast v. Gardner, 271 F. Supp. 1, 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (Frankel, J., dissenting), rev’d, 
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (adopting Judge Frankel’s standing conclusion). 
107 See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587, 638 (2007) (Souter, 
J., dissenting) (plurality opinion). Such an approach finds support in the rationales of Flast 
and Cuno, which explain that the “injury alleged in Establishment Clause challenges to 
federal spending is the very extract[ion] and spen[ding] of tax money in aid of religion.” 
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 343–44 (2006) (quoting Flast, 392 U.S. at 
106). Even the dissenting Justices in recent taxpayer standing cases have recognized as 
much. See Hein, 551 U.S. at 638 (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, J., Ginsberg, J., 
and Breyer, J.). Curiously, Justice Kagan failed to recognize this fact in Arizona Christian 
School Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1450–63 (2011) (Kagan, J., dissenting). See 
infra Part III.B.1. 
108 See, e.g., Rahdert, Forks Taken, supra note 24, at 1034 (advocating for an approach 
to Article III standing that provides for a cumulative, but not necessarily a connected, 
assessment of psychic and pocketbook harm). 
109 Hein, 551 U.S. at 639 (Souter, J., dissenting); cf. Rahdert, Forks Taken, supra note 
24, at 1034–35. 
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and spent” in violation of his Establishment Clause right of 
conscience.110  This unity of harm best embodies the Framers’ 
concern that freedom of conscience not be compromised by the 
government extracting and spending taxpayer money in support of 
religion, and makes such harm particularized enough for federal 
taxpayers to raise it in court. This is Flast’s better test. 
II 
LIMITING THE EXCEPTION TO THE RULE: MODERN TAXPAYER 
STANDING 
The question here is not . . . whether the religious clauses of the 
First Amendment are hereafter to be enforced by the federal courts; 
the issue is simply whether plaintiffs of an additional category, 
heretofore excluded from those courts, are to be permitted to 
maintain suits.111 
  —Justice John Marshall Harlan, II 
While Flast “was hardborn and . . . endured a difficult 
adolescence,”112 it has found its place in modern standing 
jurisprudence and, barring any drastic shift in the Supreme Court’s 
makeup, is here to stay.113  The proof of the pudding is in the eating: 
Flast remains a “narrow exception,” and the Supreme Court began 
limiting it shortly after the decision was handed down.114 This was 
 
110 Flast, 392 U.S. at 106 (emphasis added). I do not agree with Justice Scalia that Flast 
was based solely on “Psychic Injury,” or that the Court’s decision in Cuno confirms this 
position. See Hein, 551 U.S. at 620–29 (Scalia, J., concurring). Nor do I agree that “there 
are only two logical routes available to th[e] Court” in this area. See id. at 628. The 
problem with Justice Scalia’s position is that he defines “Wallet Injury” too narrowly—
i.e., only the claim that the plaintiff’s “tax liability is higher than it would be, but for the 
allegedly unlawful government action.” Id. at 619. While this description of taxpayer 
injury makes for an easy Article III analysis, it fails to account for the universe of possible 
claims. A proper taxpayer plaintiff could view his overall tax liability as acceptable while 
challenging how it is spent by the government. Wallet Injury (even if not traceable) can be 
proper when it directly implicates the right of conscience protected by the Establishment 
Clause. This activity is traceable (to the government’s compelled exaction for religion) and 
redressable (striking down the law). 
111 Flast, 392 U.S. at 133 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
112 Freedom from Religion Found. v. Chao, 433 F.3d 989, 997 (7th Cir. 2006) (Ripple, 
J., dissenting). 
113 Cf. Pushaw, “Accidental” Plaintiffs, supra note 28, at 105. Winn reiterated this fact, 
as seven Justices specifically voted to retain Flast and all nine applied it. See Ariz. 
Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011). 
114 See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and 
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 479–81 (1982) (no taxpayer standing to challenge executive 
branch action taken under Article IV’s Property Clause); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 
672, 689 (1971) (suggesting that no taxpayer standing exists to sue under Free Exercise 
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accomplished, in large part, by confining the Flast exception to its 
facts. 
In its 1974 decision in Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop 
the War,115 the Court refused to extend Flast beyond challenges to a 
congressional enactment under Article I, Section 8, as was the case in 
Flast.116 Ten years later, in Valley Forge Christian College v. 
Americans United for Separation of Church and State,117 the Court 
repeated this holding using language that further limited Flast’s future 
reach118 and emphasized that its exception did not relax the injury-in-
fact and redressability requirements of constitutional standing in 
Establishment Clause cases.119 And in its 2006 holding in 
DaimlerChrysler Corporation v. Cuno120 that the rule against 
taxpayer standing also applies “to so-called ‘tax expenditures,’ which 
reduce amounts available to the treasury by granting tax credits or 
exemptions,”121 the Roberts Court unanimously confirmed that “[t]he 
 
Clause); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 175 (1974) (no taxpayer standing to 
sue under Statement and Account Clause of Article I); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to 
Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 228 (1974) (no taxpayer standing to sue under Incompatibility 
Clause of Article I). 
115 418 U.S. at 208. Schlesinger involved a citizen/taxpayer challenge to the ability of a 
person to hold an Armed Forces Reserve commission simultaneously with his membership 
in Congress, pursuant to the Incompatibility Clause of Article I, Section 6, Clause 2. Id.  
116 Id. at 228. While the plaintiffs in Schlesinger raised a claim under the 
Incompatibility Clause rather than the Establishment Clause, the Court’s holding with 
regard to standing was not based on this fact. Specifically, the Court rejected taxpayer 
standing based on prong one of Flast because “respondents did not challenge an enactment 
under Art. I, § 8, but rather the action of the Executive Branch in permitting Members of 
Congress to maintain their Reserve status.” Id. 
117 454 U.S. at 464. Valley Forge involved a First Amendment challenge by taxpayers 
to the government’s free transfer of federal property to a nonprofit religious school. The 
expenditure was authorized under Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 of the Constitution. Id. 
118 Id. at 473–74 (rejecting taxpayer standing in an Establishment Clause case 
stemming not from a congressional enactment under the Taxing and Spending Clause but, 
rather, from executive branch action taken under the Property Clause). While Valley Forge 
hinged on action by the government, the action resulted in non-tax income coming into 
government’s hands. See id. at 480–81 & n.17. 
119 Id. at 485–86, 488–90. 
120 547 U.S. 332 (2006). In Cuno, the Court refused to extend Flast for alleged 
Commerce Clause violations. It held that state taxpayers lacked standing in federal court to 
challenge, under the Commerce Clause, Ohio’s investment tax credit to a major 
automobile manufacturer. Id. at 344–46. According to the Court, “[w]hatever rights 
plaintiffs have under the Commerce Clause, they are fundamentally unlike the right not to 
‘contribute three pence . . . for the support of any one [religious] establishment.”‘ Id. at 
347 (quoting JAMES MADISON, supra note 75, at 186). 
121 Id. at 343–44 (holding that a state taxpayer’s “injury” from allegedly unlawful 
legislative expenditure is “not ‘concrete and particularized [nor] actual or imminent’” 
(quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992))). Tax expenditures are 
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Court [in Flast] understood the ‘injury’ alleged in Establishment 
Clause challenges to federal spending to be the very ‘extract[ion] and 
spen[ding]’ of ‘tax money’ in aid of religion alleged by a plaintiff.”122 
One year later, the Court continued this trend in Hein v. Freedom 
From Religion Foundation.123 Hein reaffirmed, among other 
principles, that a taxpayer’s purely psychological interest in ensuring 
that appropriated funds are spent in accordance with the 
Establishment Clause does not suffice to confer standing.124 Instead, 
to meet the Flast exception as it is now understood, pocketbook injury 
is required in the form of specifically mandated and unambiguously 
appropriated public monies extracted from taxpayers and given to an 
outside religious entity in violation of the Establishment Clause.125 
Hein involved a suit by the Freedom from Religion Foundation 
(FFRF), alleging that the executive branch126 violated the 
Establishment Clause by using its discretionary funds to co-host 
conferences—open to both religious and secular non-profit groups—
 
defined by Congress as “revenue losses attributable to provisions of the Federal tax laws 
which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income or which 
provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability.” 
Congressional Budget Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 3, 88 Stat. 297, 299 (1974); see 
infra notes 151, 196, and accompanying text. 
122 Id. at 344–45 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968)) (first alteration 
added)). Arguably, Bowen v. Kendrick might be considered the lone outlier in the Supreme 
Court’s relatively consistent application of the Flast exception in cases where standing is 
litigated. 487 U.S. 589 (1988). Taxpayers in Bowen raised an Establishment Clause 
challenge the distribution of funds by the Department of Health and Human Services, 
pursuant to the Adolescent Family Life Act, providing aid to pregnant teenagers and 
adolescent parents. Id. at 593–94. The statute in question, enacted pursuant to Article I, 
Section 8, specifically authorized and unambiguously appropriated disbursement of federal 
funds to outside entities, including religious organizations. Id. Although the specific action 
challenged in the case came from an executive agency, the Court determined that an 
agency’s administration of a specific congressional mandate was of no moment under 
Flast. Id. at 618–20. This distinguishes Bowen from Hein. 
123 551 U.S. 587 (2007) (plurality opinion). Hein was a plurality opinion by Justice 
Alito that was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy. Justice Alito’s 
plurality opinion in Hein is controlling because it expresses the narrowest position taken 
by the Justices who concurred in the judgment. See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer 
Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750, 764 n.9 (1988); Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 
(1977). 
124 Hein, 551 U.S. at 599–600; see also Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 485–86. 
125 Hein, 551 U.S. at 603–04, 608–09. Of course, the extraction need not be directly 
traceable to the expenditure. 
126 This included the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, 
Department of Labor, Department of Health and Human Services, and Department of 
Education. Id. at 592–95. The government invited representatives of nonprofit groups, 
both secular and sectarian, to attend these conferences and learn about federally funded 
opportunities to receive social services grants. Id. 
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at which certain speakers, including the President and Cabinet 
officials, “used ‘religious imagery’ and praised the efficacy of faith-
based programs in delivering social services.”127 FFRF insisted that 
its members had Article III standing based solely on their interest as 
federal taxpayers.128 Rather than dismiss the case on its merits,129 a 
plurality held that the plaintiffs could not avail themselves of the 
Flast exception.130 
 
127 Id. at 592–94. The nub of the allegation was that executive branch speakers were 
promoting the idea that faith-based community programs might be more effective at 
providing social services than secular entities because of their religious orientation. Id. at 
595–96; see also Exec. Order No. 13199, 3 C.F.R. 752 (2001) (establishing the White 
House Office of the Faith-Based and Community Initiatives to ensure that “private and 
charitable community groups, including religious ones, . . . have the fullest opportunity 
permitted by law to compete on a level playing field, so long as they achieve valid public 
purposes” and adhere to “the bedrock principles of pluralism, nondiscrimination, 
evenhandedness, and neutrality”); Exec. Order No. 13279, 3 C.F.R. 258 (2002) (assisting 
faith-based community groups’ eligibility to compete for federal financial support without 
impairing their independence or autonomy, as long as they did “not use direct Federal 
financial assistance to support any inherently religious activities, such as worship, 
religious instruction, or proselytization”). 
128 Hein, 551 U.S. at 593. The plaintiffs in Hein did not challenge the validity of their 
individual tax liabilities, nor did they allege that they were in attendance at any of the co-
hosted conferences. Such an argument may have provided a separate basis for Article III 
standing as direct exposure to an offensive governmental religious object. See, e.g., 
Newdow v. Lefevre, 598 F.3d 638, 642 (9th Cir. 2010); ACLU v. Grayson Co., 591 F.3d 
837, 843 (6th Cir. 2010); Green v. Haskell Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 568 F.3d 784, 793 (10th 
Cir. 2009). 
129 Precedent in the Establishment Clause area dictated such a result. See, e.g., Ira C. 
Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Ball on a Needle: Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, 
Inc. and the Future of Establishment Clause Adjudication, 2008 BYU L. REV. 115, 116 
(2008) (“This was a lawsuit destined to go nowhere, even if the Supreme Court had 
affirmed the Seventh Circuit’s decision to uphold taxpayer standing in the case.”). The 
problem recognized by the First Amendment is not that taxpayer-salaried executive branch 
officials would speak (favorably or unfavorably) about religion or meet with religious 
groups. Cf. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 683 (2005) (plurality opinion) (“The fact 
that the Founding Fathers believed devotedly that there was a God and that the unalienable 
rights of man were rooted in Him is clearly evidenced in their writings, from the 
Mayflower Compact to the Constitution itself.” (quoting Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. 
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 213 (1963)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Rather, it was 
that compelled financial support of government-sponsored churches and Congress’s 
express use of its taxing and spending power to disburse monies outside the government to 
subsidize religion that animated the support for, and eventual adoption of, the Free 
Exercise and Establishment Clauses. See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 
330 U.S. 1, 11 (“The imposition of taxes to pay ministers’ salaries and to build and 
maintain churches and church property aroused [the Framers’] indignation. It was these 
feelings which found expression in the First Amendment.” (emphasis added)). 
130 Hein, 551 U.S. at 608–09. The plurality’s holding rested primarily on stare decisis 
and separation of powers concerns. Justice Souter’s dissent advocated for a subjective, 
case-by-case consideration of whether an alleged injury is “too abstract, or otherwise not 
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On a doctrinal level, the decision in Hein was more about the 
Supreme Court’s power to decide a legal question than the answer it 
should give. It was the Court’s definitive statement on “the rigor with 
which the Flast exception . . . ought to be applied.”131 In this regard, 
Hein concerned the fundamental limits of Flast, the scope of the 
exception to the rule against federal taxpayer standing, and the 
Supreme Court’s decision to preserve or abandon the integrity of that 
underlying rule.132 The plurality expressly adopted what Schlesinger 
and Valley Forge had implied and what Justice Powell’s concurring 
opinion in Richardson specifically urged133: “limit[ing] the expansion 
of federal taxpayer and citizen standing . . . to an outer boundary 
drawn by the results in Flast.”134 
In demarcating those results, the Hein Court emphasized 
congressional culpability. It explained that the challenged 
expenditures in Flast were funded “by a specific congressional 
appropriation” under Congress’s taxing and spending power and 
disbursed to private religious schools “pursuant to an unambiguous 
congressional mandate” that directed a certain amount of public funds 
be made available to these schools.135 Thus, the challenged 
expenditures presented “one of the specific evils” the Establishment 
Clause was designed to address—that freedom of conscience not be 
compromised by Congress extracting and spending an unwilling 
 
appropriate, to be considered judicially cognizable.” Id. at 642 (internal quotation 
omitted). 
131 Id. at 603 (quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of 
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 481 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
132 Indeed, the Hein plurality’s analysis of Flast was an integral and necessary part to 
the Court’s reasoning in that case. Hein, 551 U.S. at 602–15. As such, this reasoning 
constitutes binding precedent. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 67 (1996) 
(“When an opinion issues for the [Supreme] Court, it is not only the result but also those 
portions of the opinion necessary to that result by which we are bound.”). 
133 United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); see Hein, 551 U.S. at 610 (“[W]e 
have adopted the position set forth by Justice Powell in his concurrence in Richardson       
. . . .”). 
134 Hein, 551 U.S. at 610 (quoting Richardson, 418 U.S. at 196) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
135 Id. at 604. 
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taxpayer’s funds on religion.136 It was precisely this concern, the 
Court explained, that justified the “results in Flast.”137 
Rather than establishing any link between their taxpayer status and 
the expressly mandated and appropriated congressional enactment 
attacked,138 the best the Hein plaintiffs could do was “point to 
unspecified, lump sum” congressional budget appropriations for the 
general, discretionary use of the executive branch.139 This did not cut 
the constitutional mustard under Flast.140 Four years would pass 
before the Court would address taxpayer standing again. 
III 
WINN 
A. Case Synopsis 
Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn141  was the 
only religion case decided in the Supreme Court’s 2010 term. It 
involved an Arizona law permitting state taxpayers to claim a dollar-
 
136 Id. at 623 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also id. at 616 (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(explaining that the Establishment Clause “expresses the Constitution’s special concern 
that freedom of conscience not be compromised by government taxing and spending in 
support of religion”).  
137 Id. Assuming a sufficient taxpayer injury allegation, see supra Part.I.C, the “outer 
boundary drawn by the results in Flast” therefore meant that the exception to the general 
rule against federal taxpayer standing would apply only to taxpayer challenges of (1) 
“exercises of congressional power,” id. at 605, 615; (2) “under the Taxing and Spending 
Clause,” id. at 604–05; (3) that contain “an express congressional mandate” and a “specific 
congressional appropriation,” id. at 603–04; and (4) expressly for the expenditure of funds 
dedicated to the specific activity that violates the Establishment Clause, id. at 604–05, 
608–09. Where these elements do not exist, “the requisite ‘logical nexus’ between 
taxpayer status ‘and the type of legislative enactment attacked’” is absent because the 
taxpayer’s suit “is not directed at an exercise of congressional authority” in violation of the 
Establishment Clause. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968). Instead, he is simply 
raising a violation of law to which he is no more subjected than any other person. 
138 Flast, 392 U.S. at 102. 
139 Hein, 551 U.S. at 607–08 (holding that the appropriations challenged by plaintiffs 
were “not expressly authorized or mandated by any specific congressional enactment”). 
The Court reasoned that, “[b]ecause almost all Executive Branch activity is ultimately 
funded by some congressional appropriation, extending the Flast exception to purely 
executive expenditures would effectively subject every federal action—be it a conference, 
proclamation, or speech—to Establishment Clause challenge by any taxpayer in federal 
court.” Id. at 610. 
140 Id. at 610–11 (citing plaintiffs’ amended complaint, which focused primarily on this 
type of federal activity, including various speeches delivered by federal executive branch 
officials); see also id. at 612–14 (attacking Seventh Circuit panel’s extension of Flast, and 
the logic of its “zero-marginal-cost” test). 
141 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011). 
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for-dollar tax credit of up to $500 for donations made to school tuition 
organizations (STOs).142  STOs are private, 501(c)(3) organizations 
that use those donations to provide scholarships to children attending 
private secular and religious schools.143 The plaintiffs (and eventual 
respondents), a group of Arizona taxpayers, brought an Establishment 
Clause challenge to the tax credit program,144 arguing that it 
permitted STOs “to use State income-tax revenues to pay tuition for 
students at religious schools.”145 While the constitutionality of the 
program was a cinch based on Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,146 the case 
gained followers in light of its taxpayer standing implications.147 
 
142 Id. at 1440–41. Specifically, the Individual Scholarship Tax Credit Program, located 
in section 43-1089 of the Arizona Tax Code, permitted Arizona taxpayers to claim dollar-
for-dollar nonrefundable state income tax credits of up to $500 per person (and $1000 per 
married couple filing jointly) against state liability for donations to qualified school tuition 
organizations (STOs). ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-1089(A) (2011). This effectively 
allowed every Arizona taxpayer to choose whether $500 of his or her tax liability would 
go to the State or to an STO. A “qualified” STO must be a private, tax-exempt charity 
pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3); must allocate “at least ninety per cent of its annual 
revenue” to scholarships for children attending qualified schools; cannot restrict its grants 
to students attending only one school; and cannot discriminate on the basis of race, color, 
handicap, familial status, or national origin. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 43-1601(3), -
1602(A), -1603(B)(1)–(2) (2011). Furthermore, scholarship donors cannot request that 
their donations be designated for a particular student beneficiary, such as a dependent. Id. 
§ 43-1603(B)(4) (2011). 
 On the same day it enacted the tuition tax credit, the Arizona Legislature passed a 
parallel statute that provides corporations a dollar-for-dollar tax credit for contributions to 
STOs, as well as a statutory tax credit that benefits only public schools. See id. §§ 43-
1183, -1089.01 (2011). The latter credit allows any individual Arizona taxpayer to receive 
up to a $200 tax credit for fees paid or contributions made to public schools for various 
extracurricular activities or educational programs. Id. § -1089.01 (2011). On February 29, 
2012, Arizona’s Governor signed a revised version of § 43-1089.01 into law, which 
doubled the amount that an individual could donate to an STO. See id. § 43-1089.03 
(2012). 
143 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-1602(A); 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3). According to the 
Arizona Department of Revenue, in 2010, fifty-three school tuition organizations in the 
state awarded over 26,450 tuition scholarships to over 365 schools. ARIZ. DEP’T OF 
REVENUE, INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX CREDIT FOR DONATIONS TO PRIVATE SCHOOL 
TUITION ORGANIZATIONS: REPORTING FOR 2010 (2011), available at http://www.azdor 
.gov/Portals/0/Reports/private-school-tax-credit-report-2010.pdf. 
144 Respondents made both facial and as-applied constitutional challenges to the tax 
credit law. Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1441. Critical to the Supreme Court’s decision—and the 
scope of this Article—was the fact that the plaintiffs in Winn did not allege that parents or 
students were denied the benefits of the statute. This was a taxpayer standing case. 
145 Id. 
146 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (upholding Ohio’s need-based school voucher program against 
Establishment Clause attack, where “state aid reaches religious schools solely as a result of 
the numerous independent decisions of private individuals”); see also id. at 649 (“[O]ur 
decisions have drawn a consistent distinction between government programs that provide 
aid directly to religious schools and programs of true private choice, in which government 
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The respondents did not claim that the STOs were state actors 
subject to the Establishment Clause; nor did they argue that STOs, 
rather than private citizens, were the recipients of the challenged tax 
credits. Rather, they sued only the state of Arizona,148 based solely on 
their interest as dissenting taxpayers.149 The respondents did not 
argue that the tax credit law levied a tax on them (or anyone for that 
matter). Indeed, their stated position “concern[ed] the ability of ‘third 
party’ state taxpayers to challenge the constitutionality of a state’s 
treatment of other taxpayers” who chose to donate to an STO.150 
 
aid reaches religious schools only as a result of the genuine and independent choices of 
private individuals.”). Of course, for those who believe the purpose of the standing 
doctrine is to limit the judge-made law to circumstances where the resolution of a legal 
dispute demands it, Zelman could itself be used as a barrier to any relief in Winn-type 
cases. 
147 See Erik S. Jaffe, Looking Ahead: October Term 2010, 2010 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 
407, 423 (2010). 
148 More specifically, the respondents sued the Director of the Arizona Department of 
Revenue in his official capacity. The Superintendent of Public Instruction and various 
private STO organizations later intervened. 
149 The issue of standing was not raised until the second round of district court 
litigation in Winn. On remand from the Supreme Court, the district court assumed standing 
and dismissed the case on its merits. See Winn v. Hibbs, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1120 (D. 
Ariz. 2005) (holding that the “Tuition Tax Credit is a program of true private choice” and 
thus constitutional under Zelman). The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, however, 
concluding that the respondents had taxpayer standing under the Flast exception and that 
they had stated a valid as-applied Establishment Clause claim that the primary purpose 
and/or effect of the tax credit law was to advance religion, rather than to provide Arizona 
school children equal access to a wide range of educational options. Ariz. Christian Sch. 
Tuition Org. v. Winn, 562 F.3d 1002, 1012–23 (9th Cir. 2009). It then denied en banc 
review with such a strong dissent filed by eight judges that the original panel took it upon 
itself to write a separate opinion concurring in the denial of the rehearing so it could 
respond to the dissent. Winn v. Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org., 586 F.3d 649 (9th Cir. 
2009). The Supreme Court granted certiorari. 130 S. Ct. 3350 (2010). 
 This was not the first Establishment Clause challenge by taxpayers to Arizona’s Tax 
Credit Program. Shortly after its enactment in 1998, the Supreme Court of Arizona 
rejected such a challenge on the merits in Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606 (Ariz. 1999). 
The Kotterman court held that the statute had a secular purpose of bringing educational 
alternatives and opportunities to private schools and did not have the primary effect of 
advancing religion because the tax credit is “available to all taxpayers who are willing to 
contribute to an STO” and “multiple layers of private choice” prevented any benefits to 
religious schools being attributed to the State of Arizona. Id. at 611–14. For similar 
reasons, it rejected taxpayer challenges brought under the Arizona Constitution. Id. at 617–
25. 
150 Brief for Respondents at 33, Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 
1436 (2011) (Nos. 09-987, 09-991) [hereinafter Winn Respondents]. Respondents were 
therefore “‘third parties’ whose own tax liability was not a relevant factor.” Levin v. 
Commerce Energy, Inc., 130 S. Ct. 2323, 2335 (2010) (citing Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88 
(2004)); see also Brief for Respondents at 11, Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88 (2004) (No. 02-
1809) (explaining that respondents’ constitutional challenge to the state tax credit is “not 
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The respondents further insisted that because the Arizona state 
treasury could lose potential revenue to religious schools through 
donations permitted by the tax credit program, dissenting taxpayers 
had standing to challenge those “funds” under the Flast exception.151 
To the respondents, the Arizona legislature’s decision to provide tax 
credits to private STO donors was a decision not to tax those persons, 
which was the equivalent of a decision to tax and spend in support of 
STO tuition scholarships for students to attend religious (and secular) 
schools. In other words, the tax credit program was a government 
spending program. Arizona taxpayers who donated to STOs were 
spending government money on religion, as the money in their 
pockets was not actually theirs. 
Writing for a five-Justice majority, Justice Kennedy held that Flast 
does not grant taxpayer standing to third parties to challenge tax 
benefits provided to state taxpayers, who decide to donate through the 
Arizona program.152 The Court explained that individual taxpayer 
plaintiffs 
suffer a particular injury for standing purposes when, in violation of 
the Establishment Clause and by means of “the taxing and spending 
power,” their property is transferred through the Government’s 
Treasury to a sectarian entity. As Flast put it: “The taxpayer’s 
allegation in such cases would be that his tax money is being 
extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protections 
against such abuses of legislative power.” Flast thus “understood 
the ‘injury’ alleged in Establishment Clause challenges to federal 
spending to be the very ‘extract[ion] and spen[ding]’ of ‘tax money’ 
in aid of religion alleged by a plaintiff.”153 
 
[a] suit[] by taxpayers seeking to postpone or avoid payment of state taxes. Such suits thus 
do not seek to ‘enjoin, suspend or restrain’ the ‘assessment, levy or collection’ of taxes”); 
Hibbs, 542 U.S. at 104–05 (2004) (treating taxpayer-plaintiffs’ suit as a “[t]hird party” 
action that did not “[s]eek to stop the collection (or contest the validity) of a tax” imposed 
on them). Nor did the respondents argue that the statute expressly mandated and 
specifically appropriated government funds to religious organizations. Rather, the parties 
agreed that the law provided a tax credit to certain taxpayers who donate their money to 
qualified STOs. 
151 Winn Respondents, supra note 150, at 17 (arguing, inter alia, that tax credits and 
other plans which “reduce the revenues entering the treasury” are the same as the 
government spending its tax revenues). 
152 Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1449. 
153 Id. at 1445–46 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 
U.S. 83, 105–06 (1968); DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 348 (2006)). 
“‘Such an injury,’ Flast continued, is unlike ‘generalized grievances about the conduct of 
government’ and so is ‘appropriate for judicial redress.’” Id. at 1446 (quoting Flast, 392 
U.S. at 106). 
DEARINGER (DO NOT DELETE) 3/7/14  9:18 AM 
296 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92, 263 
According to the Supreme Court, the respondents’ taxpayer 
standing argument failed to meet the Flast exception for three primary 
reasons: (1) a tax credit is not a government expenditure under Flast; 
(2) private income that never enters the state treasury is not 
government money; and (3) three intervening layers of private choice 
do not amount to direct government action. 
1. A Tax Credit Is Not a Government Expenditure Under Flast 
First, the Arizona tax credit is not a direct government expenditure 
under Flast. A government expenditure or outlay is a direct transfer of 
government (or public) revenues, generated by taxation, to the 
subsidized entity.154  Such an expenditure is a necessary starting point 
in taxpayer lawsuits under the Establishment Clause, for without it, a 
plaintiff could not allege that the government extracted and spent his 
tax money to support religion—something the Supreme Court has 
consistently required in taxpayer challenges since Flast.155 As the 
Winn Court explained, in such a case a dissenting taxpayer “whose 
tax dollars are ‘extracted and spent’” for the challenged activity 
“knows that he has in some small measure been made to contribute to 
an establishment in violation of conscience” protected by the 
Establishment Clause.156 
 
154 The Winn Court rejected the argument that the Arizona tax credit should be 
understood as a government expenditure as a matter of law. See Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1447–
48. In so holding, the Court declined to adopt the tax expenditure analysis as a legal 
framework in this area, something it had previously refused to do. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax 
Comm’n of N.Y.C., 397 U.S. 664, 675–80 (1970) (holding that tax exemptions to 
churches did not violate the Religion Clauses); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 398–402 
(1983) (same as to tax deductions to all taxpayers for school expenses); see also Donna D. 
Adler, The Internal Revenue Code, the Constitution, and the Courts: The Use of Tax 
Expenditure Analysis in Judicial Decision Making, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 855, 857 
(1993) (conceding that the Supreme Court has “not fully applied this concept in the 
context of Establishment Clause analysis”). 
155 See supra Part I.B.3. 
156 Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1447 (quoting Flast, 392 U.S. at 106). I interpret the 
“establishment in violation of conscience” to mean the violation of the freedom of 
religious conscience from government coercion protected by the Establishment Clause. 
See id.; see also, e.g., FELDMAN, supra note 77, at 48 (“The advocates of a constitutional 
ban on establishment were concerned about paying taxes to support religious purposes that 
their consciences told them not to support.”); Jaffe, supra note 87, at 1046 (conceding that 
“an offense to such a group is an offense to the conscience of each of the persons who 
constitute the group because each is forced to participate in the official support of a 
religion”). 
 Even those who attempt to cast Winn as treating taxpayer harm in solely economic 
terms must come to grips with Justice Kennedy’s opinion, which appears to connect the 
economic and psychological harms. Compare Rahdert, Court Reform, supra note 25, at 
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A tax credit, on the other hand, is a product of legislative 
forbearance. It occurs when the government declines to impose a 
tax.157  It does not extract a penny from taxpayers, and the state makes 
no spending decision with it. Flast suspended the usual rule against 
taxpayer standing precisely to prevent compelled exaction in violation 
of the plaintiff taxpayer’s Establishment Clause rights,158 a Clause 
drafted and ratified out of a concern that individuals might be coerced 
by the federal government to “pay[] taxes to support religious 
purposes that their consciences told them not to support.”159 Absent 
an individual allegation of compelled extraction by the government, 
nothing limits that liberty of conscience, and thus no Flast claim 
exists. 
This distinction between governmental expenditures and tax credits 
doomed the Winn respondents’ chances before the “nexuses” test 
could even be applied.160 But its application would not have changed 
the Court’s conclusion. Because the respondents did not challenge the 
direct expenditure of their tax money pursuant to the taxing and 
spending power, the prong one link between a taxpayers’ status and 
the “legislative enactment attacked”161 could not be met. 
Furthermore, because the respondents retained control over their 
money in accordance with their consciences, no direct nexus existed 
between the dissenting taxpayer and the Establishment Clause under 
prong two.162 Arizona’s tuition tax credit did “not ‘extrac[t] and 
spen[d]’ a conscientious dissenter’s funds in service of an 
establishment, or ‘force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his 
property’ to a sectarian organization.”163 
 
846–47 & n.48 (arguing that Winn improperly treats the argument of taxpayer plaintiffs 
“as asserting [only] a purely economic harm”), with Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1448 (“[W]hat 
matters under Flast is whether sectarian STOs receive government funds drawn from 
general tax revenues, so that moneys have been extracted from a citizen and handed to a 
religious institution in violation of the citizen’s conscience.”). 
157 Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1447–48. 
158 Flast, 392 U.S. at 103. 
159 Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587, 638 (2007) (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (plurality opinion) (quoting FELDMAN, supra note 77, at 48). I disagree with 
Professor Feldman to the extent he argues that the Establishment Clause protects only the 
freedom of conscience. See FELDMAN, supra note 77, at 350–52, 398–411. 
160 Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1447. 
161 Flast, 392 U.S. at 102. 
162 Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1447 (“[A]warding some citizens a tax credit allows other 
citizens to retain control over their own funds in accordance with their own consciences.”). 
163 Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Flast, 392 U.S. at 106). 
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2. Private Income that Never Enters the Treasury Is Not Government 
Money 
Second, the money in a private donor’s pocket did not belong to 
Arizona. It passed from the donor’s hands to an STO without entering 
the state treasury. The respondents argued that a taxpayer’s entire 
income is government property that becomes his own only when the 
government decides not to exercise its taxation power over 100% of 
it.164 This novel theory assumes that private income should be 
considered “government property even if it has not come into the tax 
collector’s hands”—a premise which “finds no basis in standing 
jurisprudence”165 or even within the minority view of taxpayer 
standing.166 Private bank accounts, the Court explained, “cannot be 
equated with the Arizona State Treasury.”167 While the Arizona 
Department of Revenue monitored STOs and were in some way 
connected to them168—much like the executive branch in Hein was 
 
164 See Winn Respondents, supra note 150, at 17. The respondents’ position also 
attempts to distinguish between a tax credit—which the respondents treat as an 
expenditure of government funds—and a tax deduction, which is not, because it results in 
a smaller tax benefit that the taxpayer is “entitled to keep.” See id. at 6–7. This argument is 
problematic even under the respondents’ overarching tax expenditure theory, as both 
practices have the potential to reduce state revenue. Furthermore, if a taxpayer kept the 
money he otherwise would have donated to a charity, he would be taxed on those funds 
and thus would not actually keep them. 
165 Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1449. At times, the respondents’ theory in this regard resembles 
the remarkably antiquated view that all persons are possessions of the government. 
166 See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587, 639 (2007) (Souter, 
J., dissenting) (plurality opinion) (arguing that because an objecting taxpayer is injured 
when public funds are spent in aid of religion, “every taxpayer can claim a personal 
constitutional right not to be taxed for the support of a religious institution”). The minority 
view concedes that Flast is “in a class by itself” but is justified by the “Madisonian 
relationship of tax money and conscience.” Id. at 642–43. 
167 Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1448. The Arizona Supreme Court reached the same conclusion. 
See Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606, 621 (Ariz. 1999) (concluding that “this tax credit 
is not an appropriation of public money”). For this reason, the Winn plaintiffs could not 
utilize the “outsider alienation” claim of Article III standing to support their Establishment 
Clause claim, as it was private dollars, rather than state money, that provided the financial 
support to religious STOs. But see Marshall & Nichol, supra note 24, at 246 (“In Winn 
itself, the claim could be made that the Arizona taxpayers bringing suit were alienated by 
the state’s use of money to support religious schools.”). 
168 The dissent tried to connect the state and the STOs on many levels in order to 
overcome the “extract and spend” requirement of Flast. See Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1458 & 
n.9 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 43-1502(A)-(C), 43-1506 (2010)) (“[T]he statute 
establishing the initiative requires the Arizona Department of Revenue to certify STOs, 
maintain an STO registry, make the registry available to the public on request and post it 
on a website, collect annual reports filed by STOs, and send written notice to STOs that 
have failed to comply with statutory requirements.”). Cf. Marshall & Nichol, supra note 
24, at 222 & n.54. But in doing so, the dissent lost sight of the fact that the STOs were not 
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connected to the faith-based programs—STOs were not receiving tax 
credits, only the taxpayers who made donations to them were. “Like 
contributions that lead to charitable tax deductions, contributions 
yielding STO tax credits are not owed to the State and, in fact, pass 
directly from taxpayers to private organizations.”169 
3. Three Intervening Layers of Private Choice Do Not Amount to 
Direct Government Action 
Third and relatedly, the Arizona tax credit program operates 
entirely on private choice—three layers of private choice, to be exact. 
“Private citizens create private STOs; STOs choose beneficiary 
schools; and taxpayers then contribute to STOs.”170 A tax credit is 
provided only to the taxpayer who decides to donate his or her money 
to an STO, whether religious or secular.171 Without the creation of a 
private STO and a private donation, the tax credit does not operate. 
Without parents choosing a private school, the donated money goes 
nowhere. And as explained above, in either case, the money never 
enters the state treasury.172 
 
receiving the challenged tax credit; only private citizens were. Indeed, were the opposite 
true, the plaintiffs in Winn would have sued the STOs in place of the State of Arizona. And 
even if such a claim had been brought, the dissent’s argument would have failed Hein as 
an “unspecified, lump sum” congressional budget appropriation for Arizona’s mere 
maintenance of the STO registry. See Hein, 551 U.S. at 607–08; see also Freedom from 
Religion Found. v. Nicholson, 536 F.3d 730, 740–42 (7th Cir. 2008) (explaining that, to 
meet the Flast exception after Hein, taxpayers must point to “expenditures made pursuant 
to an express congressional mandate and a specific congressional appropriation [from] the 
taxpayers expressly for [the alleged violation of the Establishment Clause]”). Extending 
the Flast exception to such miscellaneous expenditures would subject nearly every 
legislative action to Establishment Clause challenge by any taxpayer. Hein specifically 
warned against this. See Hein, 551 U.S. at 607–08. “Merely claiming that tax dollars are 
being spent pursuant to an objectionable enactment is insufficient to establish [the Flast] 
link.” Morrison v. Callaway, 369 F. Supp. 1160, 1162 (D.D.C. 1974)). 
169 Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1448. 
170 Id. Indeed, a fourth layer consists of parents applying for an STO scholarship for 
their child. 
171 Id. at 1447 (“When Arizona taxpayers choose to contribute to STOs, they spend 
their own money, not money the State has collected from respondents or from other 
taxpayers.”); id. at 1448 (“Here, . . . contributions result from the decisions of private 
taxpayers regarding their own funds.”). Furthermore, as mentioned above, the donating 
taxpayer cannot earmark the donation for a particular student. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 43-1603(B)(4) (2013). 
172 Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1448. The Arizona Supreme Court concluded similarly in 
Kotterman, the precursor to Winn, explaining as follows: 
[N]o money ever enters the state’s control as a result of this tax credit. Nothing is 
deposited in the state treasury or other accounts under the management or 
possession of governmental agencies or public officials. Thus, under any 
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“While the State, at the outset, affords the opportunity to create and 
contribute to an STO, the tax credit system is implemented by private 
action and with no state intervention.”173 This private action places 
the dissenting taxpayer out of an equation that is itself created and 
driven by the discretionary, intervening choices of other private 
individuals,174 rather than the government extracting and spending 
“his tax money” to fund religious STOs or provide government 
scholarships to religious schools.175 
4. Additionally, No Traditional Article III Standing 
Winn involved a tax credit to a private individual rather than a 
direct tax appropriation from the state treasury. Further, it concerned 
that individuals’ private choice to donate to an STO rather than a 
compelled exaction and specific legislative mandate to pay for 
religious activity. Accordingly, treating the respondents’ alleged 
injury as sufficient in Winn would have extended the taxpayer 
standing exception well beyond the outer boundaries of Flast,176 
cutting the entire concept loose from its doctrinal moorings. 
 
common understanding of the words, we are not here dealing with “public 
money.” 
Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606, 618 (Ariz. 1999). 
173 Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1448. 
174 This notion was captured in Winn during an oral argument exchange between 
Justice Scalia and respondents’ counsel: 
[Counsel]: Let me—let me put it to you this way[]: Suppose the government 
in this case gave the money to the STOs directly itself, and the STOs then gave 
out the scholarships. Would it be constitutional for an STO to say to a parent who 
comes asking for a scholarship, are you Catholic? If you’re not, we won’t give 
you a scholarship— 
Justice Scalia:  Perhaps not, but you have— 
[Counsel]: What’s the difference? 
Justice Scalia:  You have an intervening . . . contributor. And it’s that person 
who is making the decision of whether to give it to a religious or nonreligious 
organization; it isn’t the government making that decision. 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 39, Winn v. Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org., 131 S. Ct. 
1436 (2011) (Nos. 09-987, 09-991), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral 
_arguments/argument_transcripts/09-987.pdf. 
175 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968). This rationale is not inconsistent with, say, 
Valley Forge, a decision that, while hinging on action by the government, dealt with 
circumstances that resulted in non-tax income coming into government’s hands. See 
Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 
U.S. 464, 467–68 (1982) (upholding transfer of surplus federal property to a nonprofit 
religious school under the Property Clause of Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2). 
176 Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587, 610 (2007) (quoting United 
States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 196 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring)). Indeed, the Court 
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However, even assuming arguendo an injury-in-fact to the 
dissenting taxpayers, the aforementioned layers of private choice and 
lack of governmental action meant that the Winn taxpayers could not 
establish causation or redressability under a traditional Article III 
analysis. In fact, the Justices appeared to unanimously agree that the 
respondents lacked standing under Article III.177 The Court explained 
that while taxing and spending measures can be traced to a 
congressional choice, the Arizona tax credit program, which forgoes 
taxing and operates on private choice, “prevent[s] any injury the 
objectors may suffer from being fairly traceable to the 
government.”178 Moreover, although the remedy sought by the 
dissenting taxpayers—an injunction against the tax credit program—
may have reduced private contributions to STOs, it would not have 
affected the noncontributing dissenter’s tax payments. Thus “any 
injury suffered by respondents would not be remedied” by the 
injunction sought.179  Not only did the government not extract or 
spend the respondents’ tax money on religion,180 their tax payments 
would not have changed based on a successful lawsuit. 
Furthermore, the respondents’ diminished revenue injuries failed 
the causation requirement of Article III for at least three reasons.181 
First, the respondents were unable to establish that state revenues had 
actually decreased due to the tax credit program.182 Indeed, as the 
Court explained, “[b]y helping students obtain scholarships to private 
schools, both religious and secular,” Arizona’s STO program could 
just as likely “relieve the burden placed on Arizona’s public schools,” 
 
explained that “[i]t would be a departure from Flast’s stated rationale.” Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 
1447. 
177 Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1448–49 (plurality opinion); id. at 1449–50 (Scalia, J., 
concurring); id. at 1451 (Kagan, J., dissenting). But see id. at 1451 (conceding that the case 
“cannot be resolved” by the traditional standing analysis). A recently published article 
criticizing Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Winn is premised, mistakenly, on the 
ground that traditional Article III standing was up for grabs in the case. See Marshall & 
Nichol, supra note 24, at 227–29. 
178 Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1448. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. 
181 See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (holding that 
under the second prong of the tripartite Article III standing test, “there must be a causal 
connection between the injury and the conduct complained of”). 
182 Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1444; see also DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 
344 (2006) (rejecting a similar argument involving Ohio state tax credit to induce 
DaimlerChrysler expansion within the state, finding it “unclear that tax breaks of the sort 
at issue here do in fact deplete the treasury: [t]he very point of the tax benefits is to spur 
economic activity, which in turn increases government revenues” (emphasis added)). 
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resulting in “an immediate and permanent cost savings for the 
State.”183  Second, causation problems also plagued the respondents’ 
other alleged revenue injury—an increased individual tax burden.184 
As the Court explained, because tax credits like Arizona’s § 43-
1089(A) can actually secure “cost savings for the state,”185 it is more 
likely that an objecting taxpayer’s economic position will be better, 
not worse.186 Even overlooking the speculative nature of this alleged 
injury, proving causation and redressability would force courts to 
assume that lawmakers would respond to diminished state revenues 
(or an injunction against the STO tax credits) by increasing the tax 
burdens of its people,187 and “that any tax increase would be traceable 
to the STO tax credits, as distinct from other governmental 
expenditures or other tax benefits.”188 Each of these conclusions 
would require courts to play politics and assume specific exercises of 
fiscal discretion by a state legislature to establish standing—
something the Court unanimously rejected in Cuno.189  
Third and finally, causation was wanting because, by the 
respondents’ own admission, the conduct complained of was taken 
not by the government, but rather by other (donating) taxpayers. 
Article III’s causation requirement asks whether the injury is “fairly   
. . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not [the] 
resul[t of] the independent action of some third party not before the 
 
183 Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1444 (“[T]he average value of an STO scholarship may be far 
less than the average cost of educating an Arizona public school student. Because it 
encourages scholarships for attendance at private schools, the STO tax credit may not 
cause the State to incur any financial loss.”); see also Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 395 
(1983) (“By educating a substantial number of students [private] schools relieve public 
schools of a correspondingly great burden—to the benefit of all taxpayers.”). 
184 See, e.g., Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923) (noting that the “effect 
upon future taxation, of any payment out of funds” is too “remote, fluctuating and 
uncertain” to give rise to a case or controversy under Article III). 
185 Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1444. 
186 Id. at 1443–44; see, e.g., Cuno, 547 U.S. at 344 (“The very point of the tax benefits 
is to spur economic activity, which in turn increases government revenues.” (emphasis 
added)); Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606, 621 (Ariz. 1999). 
187 Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1444 (such a scenario requires a court to “speculate ‘that elected 
officials will increase a taxpayer-plaintiff’s tax bill to make up a deficit.’” (quoting Cuno, 
547 U.S. at 344)). 
188 Id. 
189 See Cuno, 547 U.S. at 344 (“Federal courts may not assume a particular exercise of  
. . . state fiscal discretion in establishing standing: a party seeking federal jurisdiction 
cannot rely on such ‘[s]peculative inferences . . . to connect [his] injury to the challenged 
actions of [the defendant].”); ASARCO v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 614 (1989). 
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court.”190 The gravamen of the respondents’ lawsuit concerned their 
ability “to challenge the constitutionality of a state’s treatment of 
other taxpayers.”191 The private decisions by these other taxpayers to 
donate their money to private STOs, and later take a tax credit, breaks 
any possible chain of causation between the alleged injury and 
government action. Moreover, as parties who were not “the object of 
the Government action [they challenge],” it is highly unlikely that the 
respondents could have met the “substantially more difficult” 
causation standard reiterated in Lujan.192 
B. Justice Kagan’s Dissent 
Justice Kagan authored an impassioned dissent in Winn that 
predicted the complete demise of the taxpayer standing exception in 
Establishment Clause cases.193 She did not conclude that Flast or its 
progeny should be overturned in favor of a more relaxed standard.194 
 
190 Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41–42 (1976) (emphasis added); 
see also Kadish, 490 U.S. at 614–15. 
191 See Winn Respondents, supra note 150, at 33. 
192 “When . . . a plaintiff’s asserted injury arises from the government’s allegedly 
unlawful regulation . . . of someone else, much more is needed.” Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992) (emphasis omitted). When the existence of an 
“element[] of standing ‘depends on the unfettered choices made by independent actors not 
before the courts and whose exercise of broad and legitimate discretion the courts cannot 
presume either to control or to predict,’” the plaintiff must present facts showing that the 
independent actors will proceed in such a manner. Id. (quoting Kadish, 490 U.S. at 615); 
see Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 504–08 (explaining that “the indirectness of the injury  
. . . may make it substantially more difficult to meet the minimum requirement of Art. 
III”); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617–18 (1973) (holding that “[t]he party 
who invokes [judicial] power must be able to show . . . that he has sustained or is 
immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury” (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923))). Were it otherwise, the Winn 
respondents would have found a way to manipulate the taxpayer standing doctrine and 
ultimately set legal precedent in the Establishment Clause arena despite no particularized 
connection to the case. The tail would wag the dog. 
193 Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1450–63 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Today’s decision devastates 
taxpayer standing in Establishment Clause cases.”). Justice Kagan’s Winn dissent was the 
first of her Supreme Court tenure. It was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and 
Sotomayor. Justice Kagan’s dissent underscored that the Court had, on several occasions, 
reached a decision on the merits of Establishment Clause tax credit cases without 
questioning the plaintiffs’ standing. Id. at 1452–53 (collecting cases). As explained by 
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion, however, because those decisions did not so much as 
mention standing, they do not stand for the proposition that no jurisdictional defect 
existed. Id. at 1448–49. This Article does not address that issue. 
194 The Winn dissent’s workaround may have been to treat Flast as a “guarantee of 
access to the Judiciary.” Id. at 1450. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has never espoused 
such a view. 
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Rather, according to the dissent, a “simple restatement of the Flast 
standard,” was enough to establish that the respondents had standing: 
“[Respondents] attack a provision of the Arizona tax code that the 
legislature enacted pursuant to the State Constitution’s taxing and 
spending clause (Flast nexus, part 1). And they allege that this 
provision violates the Establishment Clause (Flast nexus, part 2).”195 
The fact that Arizona used a tax credit rather than a direct government 
subsidy was of no moment, Justice Kagan explained, as the same 
injury resulted.196 Nor was it problematic to the dissent that the 
respondents never alleged that their “tax money [wa]s being extracted 
and spent” in violation of the Establishment Clause,197 because under 
Flast “restated,” no such injury was necessary. In Justice Kagan’s 
view, because “[t]axpayers who oppose state aid of religion have 
equal reason to protest,” whether the aid comes from a tax credit or a 
government subsidy, their opposition was sufficient to confer 
standing under Flast.198 
 
195 Id. at 1451 (Kagan, J., dissenting). But see id. at 1452 (“Finding standing here is 
merely a matter of applying Flast.”); see supra Part I.B.3. 
196 Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1450 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
197 See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968). Indeed, the dissent treated this as a 
new requirement. Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1448–49 (Kagan, J., dissenting). But see 
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 343–44 (2006) (explaining that “injury 
alleged in Establishment Clause challenges to federal spending is the very extract[ion] and 
spen[ding] of tax money in aid of religion” (quoting Flast, 392 U.S. at 106)). Even the 
dissenting Justices in recent taxpayer standing cases have recognized as much. See Hein v. 
Freedom from Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587, 638 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by 
Stevens, J., Ginsberg, J., and Breyer, J.). According to Justice Kagan, the only injury 
taxpayers need to establish under Flast is whether any legislature uses its taxing and 
spending power to “channel tax dollars to religious activities.” Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1459. 
198 Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1450 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Either way, the government has 
financed the religious activity. And so either way, taxpayers should be able to challenge 
the subsidy.”). At the outset of her dissent, Justice Kagan saw fit to distinguish “principle” 
from precedent. See id. The former was clearly her belief that tax expenditure analysis 
should be embraced in the legal landscape of taxpayer standing. Id. at 1452 & n.1. That 
budgetary concept “posits that, regardless of where the [economic] program or policy 
appears, all subsidy, incentive, and relief programs should be evaluated by the same 
standards.” Adler, supra note 154, at 860–61. It therefore treats direct expenditures and tax 
breaks identically as a matter of economic policy. Edward A. Zelinsky, Are Tax 
“Benefits” Constitutionally Equivalent to Direct Expenditures?, 112 HARV. L. REV. 379, 
380–81 (1998). Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not cooperated. See supra note 154. 
 This is an article about standing, and as such, it does not address the economic policy 
nuances of tax expenditure analysis or the wisdom of constitutionalizing that budgetary 
theory. For excellent pieces that do, see generally Edward A. Zelinsky, Winn and the 
Inadvisability of Constitutionalizing Tax Expenditure Analysis, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 25 
(2011); Edward D. Kleinbard, The Congress Within the Congress: How Tax Expenditures 
Distort Our Budget and Our Political Processes, 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1 (2010); Linda 
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C. Four Critiques of the Winn Dissent 
A preeminent tax scholar recently explained how Justice Kagan’s 
dissent in Winn overlooked the avenue of municipal taxpayer standing 
in federal court as well as the ability of state taxpayers to challenge 
tax policies under more liberal standing rules in state courts.199 I 
argue that Justice Kagan also exaggerated the reach of Winn on a 
doctrinal level by ignoring the nub of the injury in Flast, conflating 
the legal incidence of tax credits and government expenditures in this 
area, overstating the predicted underenforcement of the Establishment 
Clause, and incorrectly assuming that the Flast exception applies to 
state taxpayers in federal court. 
1. The Dissent Ignores the Heart of the Injury in Flast: Taxpayer 
Harm 
Though passionate and well written, Justice Kagan’s arguments 
lack substantive punch. First, while the Winn dissent recycles the 
vague two-prong phraseology of the Flast test, it ignores the heart of 
the injury in Flast, the most recent Supreme Court taxpayer standing 
decisions interpreting it, and the undisputed fact that the taxpayer 
standing exception has been limited to the results in Flast.200 
As explained above, “a taxpayer alleges injury only by virtue of his 
liability for taxes.”201 In the Establishment Clause context, this moves 
 
Sugin, Tax Expenditure Analysis and Constitutional Decisions, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 407 
(1999). 
199 Edward A. Zelinsky, Putting State Courts in the Constitutional Driver’s Seat: State 
Taxpayer Standing after Cuno and Winn, 40 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 47–52 (2012) 
[hereinafter Zelinsky, Driver’s Seat]. The Supreme Court has left untouched the municipal 
taxpayer standing rule first identified in Frothingham, which had been treated as similar to 
that of a stockholder of a private corporation, and thus involved less attenuated interests 
than that of federal or state taxpayers due to “the peculiar relation of the corporate 
taxpayer to the corporation.” DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 349 (2006) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 
(1923)). Municipal taxpayer standing is beyond the scope of this Article. For excellent 
pieces attacking the underpinnings of that doctrine as applied to the twenty-first century, 
see Zelinsky, Driver’s Seat, supra, at 53–57; Nancy C. Staudt, Taxpayers in Court: A 
Systematic Study of a (Misunderstood) Standing Doctrine, 52 EMORY L.J. 771, 841–43 
(2003) [hereinafter Staudt, Taxpayers in Court]. 
200 See supra Part I.B.3. 
201 Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, 
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 478 (1982) (citing Flast, 392 U.S. at 102); see also Hein v. Freedom 
from Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587, 599 (2007) (explaining that taxpayer standing claims 
are premised on the theory that “having paid lawfully collected taxes into the Federal 
Treasury[,] . . . [taxpayers] have a continuing, legally cognizable interest in ensuring that 
those funds are not used by the Government in a way that violates the Constitution”). 
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plaintiffs from those alleging “that the Constitution has been violated 
[and] nothing else”202 to persons injured as taxpayers. Flast presumes 
the quintessential and threshold taxpayer injury of compelled exaction 
by the government.203 It stands for the limited204 proposition that a 
federal taxpayer plaintiff whose “tax money is . . . extracted and 
spent” by Congress on religion has standing to protest that his money 
is being used in alleged violation of the Establishment Clause.205 
To this end, the proper distinction is not about a literally traceable 
economic injury, as Justice Kagan would have it.206 Instead, the 
threshold requirement is that the plaintiff himself is coerced, by virtue 
of a tax on his income, to pay for government-compelled support of 
religion in violation of his rights of conscience.207 The Winn dissent 
prefers to skip this taxpayer harm aspect of the Flast exception, in 
part by claiming—incorrectly—that Flast’s “extract and spend” 
premise has played no formal role in the Court’s taxpayer standing 
cases.208 According to the dissenters, the constitutionality of 
Arizona’s tax credit program can be challenged by any taxpayer 
because it resembles a government spending program, is located in 
 
202 Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 485. 
203 See Flast, 392 U.S. at 106; Cuno, 547 U.S. at 343–44; supra Part I.B.3; see also 
Doremus v. Bd. of Educ. of Hawthorne, 342 U.S. 429, 433–34 (1952) (denying taxpayer 
standing because the plaintiffs made “no allegation that [the alleged unconstitutional 
activity of mandated Bible reading] is supported by any separate tax or paid for from any 
particular appropriation or that it adds any sum whatever to the cost of conducting the 
school” and distinguishing the outcome in Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 
U.S. 1 (1947), where the plaintiffs “showed a measurable appropriation or disbursement of 
school-district funds occasioned solely by the activities complained of”). 
204 See Hein, 551 U.S. at 610 (specifically adopting Justice Powell’s concurring opinion 
in United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 196 (1974), which “limit[ed] the expansion 
of federal taxpayer and citizen standing . . . to an outer boundary drawn by the results in 
Flast” (quoting Richardson, 418 U.S. at 196) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis 
added by Hein Court)); see also Pelphrey v. Cobb Cnty, 547 F.3d 1263, 1280 (11th Cir. 
2008) (stating that “[t]he Flast exception remains narrow”); In re Navy Chaplaincy, 534 
F.3d 756, 761 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“The [Supreme] Court has subsequently made clear that 
Flast is a very narrow exception to the general bar against taxpayer standing.”); Laskowski 
v. Spellings, 546 F.3d 822, 826 (7th Cir. 2008) (“The Supreme Court has now made it 
abundantly clear that Flast is not to be expanded at all.”). 
205 Flast, 392 U.S. at 106; see supra Part I.B.3. 
206 See Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1460-61 (2011) 
(Kagan, J., dissenting), (“No taxpayer can point to an expenditure (by cash grant or 
otherwise) and say that her own tax dollars are in the mix; in fact, they almost surely are 
not.”). 
207 See supra Part I.B.3. 
208 Of course, a unanimous Court recognized this precept in Cuno. See 547 U.S. at 343–
44. Furthermore, as stated supra note 107, even the dissenting Justices in recent taxpayer 
standing cases have recognized this limitation. 
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the Arizona tax code, was enacted pursuant to Arizona’s equivalent of 
the Taxing and Spending Clause, and allegedly violates the 
Establishment Clause.209 
However, if the taxpayer injury is qualitatively distinguishable 
from the general grievance that the government has acted 
unconstitutionally—a point the Winn dissent concedes210—that 
difference must exist, and it must be qualitatively explained. Flast’s 
exception is based entirely on such a difference. The difference, of 
course, is the government’s compelled exaction and spending of a 
taxpayer’s funds to support religion.211 It is through these taxed funds 
that the taxpayer first becomes the object of a potentially 
unconstitutional exercise of power at the hands of the government.212 
This is because the levying of taxes and spending of tax revenue is 
precisely how government coerces—rather than suggests, encourages, 
or even incentivizes—taxpayers to fund the cost of supporting 
religion.213 Where no specific tax is involved, a taxpayer’s Flast right 
to protest a compelled exaction evaporates. 
Were it otherwise, taxpayer status would not matter; bare 
government support of religion would provide standing for any 
intellectually dissatisfied plaintiff,214  including third-parties 
challenging the treatment of other taxpayers.215 The taxpayer injury 
would be qualitatively indistinguishable from the generalized 
grievance.216 Any plaintiff could challenge any legislative decision to 
collect anything less than every penny of available income from 
others. Furthermore, Justice Kagan’s argument that persons who 
choose not to donate to STOs are economically worse off than their 
donating counterparts217 fails to acknowledge, much less implicate, 
 
209 See Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1451–52 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
210 Id. at 1451 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
211 Cf. Flast, 392 U.S. at 106; Cuno, 547 U.S. at 343–44. 
212 See supra Part I.B.3. 
213 See supra Part I.B.3. 
214 In other words, if actual taxpayer harm was not a requirement under Flast, why 
require the taxpayer status? Why not simply allow all citizens to raise claims for any and 
all potential government support for religion? 
215 See Winn Respondents, supra note 150, at 33 (conceding that their lawsuit 
“concern[ed] the ability of ‘third party’ state taxpayers to challenge the constitutionality of 
a state’s treatment of other taxpayers”). 
216 See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and 
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 483 (1982) (stating that a “generalized grievance about the 
conduct of government” is nonjusticiable). Here, the grievance would be a religious 
difference. 
217 Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1457–58 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
DEARINGER (DO NOT DELETE) 3/7/14  9:18 AM 
308 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92, 263 
the rights of conscience protected by the Establishment Clause. Those 
non-donating Arizonans are no worse off in that they are not subject 
to the compelled exaction in support of religion. Conversely, to the 
extent these taxpayers raise an economic injury unaccompanied by a 
violation of their rights of conscience, they do not meet the Flast 
exception in the first place. 
A forced, taxpayer contribution by the government to an outside 
religious entity was the gravamen of the claim in Flast, and it simply 
did not exist in Winn, no matter how hard the respondents tried to 
manufacture it.218 Their challenge was not based on the argument that 
a certain unconstitutional tax was levied against them or that their tax 
money was being spent in a manner to which they objected. It was not 
based on their taxes whatsoever.219  
2. The Dissent Conflates the Economic and Legal Incidences of Tax 
Credits and Direct Expenditures 
Second, the Winn dissent insists that tax credits are economically 
“indistinguishable” from direct government expenditures and thus 
should be treated identically for purposes of standing.220 This 
economic fungibility argument,221 however, equates the potential 
budgetary burden of a tax credit with its legal incidence. Justice 
Kagan undoubtedly is correct that governments, as an economic 
matter, care equally about the financial impact of tax credits and 
 
218 Justice Kagan appears to have admitted this much in her dissent. See id. at 1462 
(noting that the Arizona tax credit law did not “force[] any given taxpayer to pay for the 
subsidy out of her pocket”). 
219 At most, it was based on the taxes paid and credits received by third party taxpayers. 
The connection between the respondents’ tax bill and the tax credit that someone else 
obtained, however, is much more attenuated. The latter can choose to contribute to a 
purely secular organization, or might choose to contribute nothing. At most, the state of 
Arizona was forcing the respondent taxpayers to subsidize other taxpayers’ charitable 
impulses concerning education, which may or may not support a religion. That may be 
unfair, but it does not meet the Flast exception, much less an Establishment Clause injury 
that the exception protects. 
220  Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1456 (Kagan, J., dissenting); cf. Adler, supra note 154, at 859–
60 (“Although the primary objective of the [Internal Revenue Code] is to raise revenue, it 
is also used as a fiscal, economic, and social policy tool.”). 
221 Justice Kagan’s argument channels the Valley Forge dissents on this topic. See 
Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 511–12 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“It can make no constitutional 
difference in the case before us whether the donation to the petitioner here was in the form 
of a cash grant to build a facility or in the nature of a gift of property including a facility 
already built.” (citing Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971))); id. at 515 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (disputing any fundamental jurisprudential difference “between a disposition of 
funds pursuant to the Spending Clause and a disposition of realty pursuant to the Property 
Clause”). 
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expenditures.222 But the budgetary practices and concerns of 
politicians do not determine, as a legal question, the standing of a 
taxpayer to challenge a tax credit on Establishment Clause grounds. 
Furthermore, the legal question is more complicated than whether 
“indistinguishable” financial mechanisms are being used to facilitate 
religious subsidy.223 Money may be fungible while providers are 
not.224 For example, Justice Kagan’s vogue “bailout” hypothetical 
asks whether providing government money to banks through a tax 
credit, rather than direct appropriations, would “calm the furor” of 
those opposed to the bailout.225 Even in that case, however, the 
federal government still decides on whom to spend the money (big 
banks), and the banks would therefore be assured the funds in either 
scenario. By contrast, decisions on whether, when, and how to fund 
STOs in Arizona—including whether to fund religious or non-
 
222 Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1456–57 (Kagan, J., dissenting); see also Adler, supra note 154, 
at 861–63 (noting that Congress explicitly adopted tax expenditure analysis for all its 
budgetary matters as part of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974). 
223 See id. at 1456–57 (Kagan, J., dissenting); see also Marshall & Nichol, supra note 
24, at 237 (arguing that the taxpayer’s “wound is the same regardless of whether taxes are 
directly levied to support a religious institution or credits are used to accomplish an 
identical result. Either way, tax obligations are being deployed to facilitate religious 
subsidy. In both cases, a contesting plaintiff presents only a nonparticularized psychic 
grievance.”). I respectfully disagree with Justice Kagan, as well as Professors Marshall and 
Nichol in this regard. In the case of a direct tax levied from the plaintiff, his psychic injury 
as a taxpayer cannot exist without the compelled exaction of his funds by the government 
to pay for religion. The extracting and spending of taxes is precisely how government 
coerces—rather than suggests, encourages, or incentivizes—taxpayers to fund the cost of 
supporting religion. In the case of the tax credit to third parties, the injury is comprised of 
psychic injury alone. A private decision is made to provide money to religion, of which the 
plaintiff can choose not to contribute. There is no compelled exaction and no unity of 
taxing and spending by the government. See supra Part I.B.3. 
224 For a comical attack on the economic fungibility rationale in the taxpayer standing 
context, see Boris I. Bittker, The Case of the Fictitious Taxpayer: The Federal Taxpayer’s 
Suit Twenty Years After Flast v. Cohen, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 364, 368–71 (1969) 
(lamenting, among several other offshoots, the “dormant taxpayer” doctrine, perpetuated 
by the notion that because “money is fungible, . . . offensive expenditures might have been 
financed with the ‘tax money’ contributed by the plaintiff in past years,” despite the fact 
that his income was below the exemption level during the year his suit was commenced); 
see also id. at 369–70 (noting that the “incipient taxpayer” doctrine—i.e., taxpayer 
standing for non-taxpayers who “could reasonably be expected to become taxpayers at a 
later time”—naturally “swallowed up the dormant taxpayer doctrine,” because “if a suit 
can be maintained by one who has not yet helped to finance his government’s operations, 
it can a fortiori be maintained by an incipient taxpayer”). 
225 See Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1455–56 (Kagan, J., dissenting). Though Justice Kagan’s 
rhetoric informs her position on the analytical soundness of Flast’s “extract and spend” 
requirement, her hypothetical concerning the bailout does not pretend to replicate any 
possible taxpayer standing circumstance. 
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religious STOs—were made by private individuals.226  In that way, 
Justice Kagan’s example actually underscores a major doctrinal 
difference between a legislature’s decision to extract and appropriate 
public monies to STOs and Arizona’s decision to leave that decision 
to Arizonans. As explained above, while tax credits are based on 
voluntary private conduct, and are intended to encourage or 
incentivize a given behavior,227 appropriation spending happens 
despite any behavior one might take.228 Even if a tax credit program 
is viewed as incentivizing private individuals to donate to STOs, the 
ultimate decision is out of Caesar’s hands. 
Moreover, a great many things that are “economically 
indistinguishable” are not actually or legally identical. The argument 
that, after X or Y occurs, the government may be left in an 
economically indistinguishable position (transaction costs aside), is 
not a valid basis for invoking the Flast exception. Indeed, the 
government was left in a similar position in Hein—its money was 
indisputably spent in support of religion—and the Supreme Court did 
not settle for equivalencies.229 If economic indistinguishability was 
insufficient in a government spending case (Hein),230 so too would it 
be when the challenged spending is the product of private choice 
 
226 See id. at 1438–39 (“When the government collects and spends taxpayer money, 
governmental choices are responsible for the transfer of wealth. . . . Here, by contrast, 
contributions result from the decisions of private taxpayers regarding their own funds. 
Private citizens create private STOs; STOs choose beneficiary schools; and taxpayers then 
contribute to STOs.”). Put differently, while constructing a church and providing for all of 
its supplies is equally offensive to the Establishment Clause as the government giving the 
church the money to build and purchase the supplies itself, the same cannot be said for the 
private individual who decides, in the first instance, to provide his money to the church for 
that purpose. Of course, the counterargument here is that in Winn, the challenged decision 
wasn’t entirely made by private choice. The creation of the tax credit was the doings of the 
government, which thus enabled private citizens to make the choice to donate. 
227 Tax credits are much like deductions in this regard. Cf. 26 U.S.C. §§ 170(c), 174, 
401, 501 (2010) (providing tax deductions that incentivize charitable giving, research and 
development, and even saving money for its own sake). 
228 Cf. Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y.C., 397 U.S. 664, 690 (Brennan, J., concurring); 
see also supra note 152; infra notes 231–32. 
229 See Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587, 608–09 (2007); see also 
supra Part II. 
230 Hein, 551 U.S. at 608–09 (rejecting taxpayer standing to challenge executive branch 
discretionary spending as violating the Establishment Clause and holding that the Flast 
exception applies only when Congress specifically mandates and unambiguously 
appropriates public money extracted from taxpayers to a religious entity or for religious 
uses). 
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(Winn).231 Although the Court has countenanced the comparison 
between indirect tax expenditures and direct outlays in certain 
contexts,232 it has specifically rejected it in Establishment Clause 
cases, finding “no genuine nexus between tax exemption and 
establishment of religion” because the government’s decision to 
forego potential tax revenue does not provoke the historical concerns 
that animated the Clause.233 If, as some believe, standing is a mere 
 
231 See Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1446–48. Here, again, the dissent’s argument proves too 
much. It would apply to tax deductions for contributions to religious institutions just as 
much as to tax credits, despite the former being specifically permitted by law. See, e.g., 26 
U.S.C. § 170(c) (allowing a taxpayer to deduct from taxable income, any “contribution or 
gift to or for the use of . . . [a] corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or foundation  
. . . organized and operated exclusively for religious . . . purposes”); see also, e.g., Walz, 
397 U.S. at 679 (holding that tax exemptions for churches did not violate the Religion 
Clauses); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 403 (1983) (same as to tax deductions to all 
taxpayers for school expenses); United States Catholic Conference v. Baker, 885 F.2d 
1020, 1032 (2d Cir. 1989) (rejecting pro-choice plaintiffs’ challenge to the tax-exempt 
status of the Catholic Church for lack of clergy, voting, competitive advantage, or taxpayer 
standing). But see Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 247 n.23 (1982) (holding that a statute 
that makes “explicit and deliberate distinctions between different religious organizations,” 
thus communicating government endorsement or disapproval of such religions, is 
justiciable and subject to strict scrutiny); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 
598–99 (1983) (holding that racially discriminatory schools are not “charitable” as defined 
by the Code and, therefore, the IRS can deny them tax-exempt status). 
232 See, e.g., Regan v. Taxation with Rep. of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 544–45 (1983) (with 
respect to free speech challenge to IRS’s limitation on lobbying by 501(c)(3) 
organizations); Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 591 (with respect to equal protection clause 
challenges to revocation of tax-exempt status of racially discriminatory institution). But 
see Adler, supra note 154, at 868 (conceding that “no court has explicitly adopted the term 
‘tax expenditure analysis’”). Justice Kagan’s dissent in Winn used the same fact to argue 
for the opposite proposition. See Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1452 (“In the decades since Flast, no 
court—not one—has differentiated between appropriations and tax expenditures in 
deciding whether litigants have standing.”). 
233 See Walz, 397 U.S. at 675. Justice Brennan elaborated in his concurring opinion: 
[T]hose who urge the [religious tax] exemptions’ unconstitutionality argue that 
exemptions are the equivalent of governmental subsidy of churches. General 
subsidies of religious activities would, of course, constitute impermissible state 
involvement with religion. 
 Tax exemptions and general subsidies, however, are qualitatively different. 
Though both provide economic assistance, they do so in fundamentally different 
ways. A subsidy involves the direct transfer of public monies to the subsidized 
enterprise and uses resources exacted from taxpayers as a whole. An exemption, 
on the other hand, involves no such transfer. It assists the exempted enterprise 
only passively, by relieving a privately funded venture of the burden of paying 
taxes. 
Id. at 690 (footnotes omitted); see Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 
U.S. 819, 882 n.7 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) (explaining that “the Court in Walz 
explicitly distinguished tax exemptions from direct money subsidies and rested its decision 
on that distinction”). 
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proxy for judgment on the merits,234 rejecting taxpayer standing in 
such cases would make even further sense, notwithstanding economic 
indistinguishability.235  
In this respect, the psychological aspect of Flast’s normative test 
provides another reason why a purely economic (tax expenditure) 
analysis of the Arizona tax credit is improper as a legal doctrine. The 
argument raised by the Winn dissenters, that persons who choose not 
to donate to STOs are economically worse off than donators, fails to 
account for the fact that,236 as a matter of constitutional law, they are 
better off psychologically to the extent that they are not subject to the 
compelled exaction in support of religion that is the heart of Flast.237 
3. The Dissent’s Fear of an Underenforced Establishment Clause Is 
Greatly Exaggerated and Not an Independent Basis for Granting 
Standing 
Third, Justice Kagan’s fear that, in many cases, “no one other than 
taxpayers”238 will have standing in an Establishment Clause tax credit 
case is not a reason to grant them standing. The Supreme Court has 
consistently rejected the theory that if no person would otherwise 
 
234 See, e.g., William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 223 
(1988); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741, 1742–
43 (1999) (contending that standing decisions, as a mere proxy for the merits, can be 
predicted by the ideologies of judges and the type of plaintiff); Daniel A. Farber, Standing 
on Hot Air: American Electric Power and the Bankruptcy of Standing Doctine, 121 YALE 
L.J. ONLINE 121, 122 (2011) (“The unpredictability and ideological nature of standing law 
seems inherent in the three-part test, whose terms seem to serve as a kind of Rorschach 
inkblot allowing each Justice to project her own worldview onto each case.”). But see 
Daniel E. Ho & Erica L. Ross, Did Liberal Judges Invent the Standing Doctrine? An 
Empirical Study of the Evolution of Standing, 1921–2006, 62 STAN. L. REV. 591, 647–54 
(2010) (discussing political valence of standing decisions and concluding “our evidence 
shows that standing preferences are distinguishable from merits preferences”); Staudt, 
Taxpayers in Court, supra note 199, at 650–66 (finding, in an empirical study of taxpayer 
standing to challenge government spending projects, that only forty-two percent of 
taxpayers who obtained standing also prevailed on the merits, “a finding that suggests 
courts do not use standing as a means of deciding the merits but instead make two 
independent decisions”). 
235 See supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
236 See Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1457–58 (Kagan, J., dissenting); Marshall & Nichol, supra 
note 24, at 237. 
237 See supra Part I.B.3. 
238 Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1451 (Kagan, J., dissenting); see also Epstein, supra note 51, at 
3 (noting the fear that “[i]f no one has standing to call [the government] to account, it can 
disregard the law with impunity—a result that would make an ass of the law” (quoting 
WILLIAM WADE & CHRISTOPHER FORSYRH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (7th ed. 1994))). 
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have standing, there is sufficient reason to grant standing.239 Were the 
opposite true, the doctrine would be observed only when satisfied. 
The dissent’s fear of an underenforced Establishment Clause is not 
only incorrect, it perpetuates a myth that taxpayer standing is the 
primary method for plaintiffs to raise challenges under the Clause.240 
This ignores, for example, claims involving underinclusive religious 
tax exemptions,241 government action that coerces or proscribes 
various religious activity,242 public religious displays,243 and other 
 
239 Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, 
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 479 (1982) (citing Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 
418 U.S. 208, 228 (1974)). Indeed, the lack of standing for certain taxpayers often 
supports the conclusion that the subject matter is more properly committed to the 
mechanisms of fast (or political) constitutionalism: the discretion of the executive branch, 
the scrutiny of the legislature and, ultimately, the political process. Cf. United States v. 
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974). Plaintiffs do not get a pass on standing because 
their claim arises under a counter-majoritarian right. See Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 484 
(rejecting a “hierarchy of constitutional values” or “sliding scale” standing doctrine “under 
which the Art. III burdens diminish as the ‘importance’ of the claim on the merits 
increases” and concluding that the “norm of conduct” set by the Establishment Clause is 
no more (or less) fundamental “than any other inscribed in the Constitution”). Indeed, 
Valley Forge specifically rejected the idea that “enforcement of the Establishment Clause 
demands special exceptions from the requirement that a plaintiff allege ‘distinct and 
palpable injury to himself.’” Id. at 488. 
240 Rahdert, Court Reform, supra note 25, at 844 (“To be sure, there have been many 
Establishment Clause challenges over the years since Flast that did not depend either 
directly or indirectly on taxpayer standing.”). In fairness, Professor Rahdert rightfully 
explains that without the Flast exception, challenges to tax credits such as that in Winn 
would be impossible in federal court. See id. at 850. That, however, is much narrower a 
point than Justice Kagan was trying to make. See Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1461 (opining that 
the Court’s decision “insulate[s government] financing of religious activity from legal 
challenge”). 
241 E.g., Tex. Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 14–17 (1989) (plurality opinion) 
(holding that tax exemption for religious property violates the Establishment Clause if 
drawn too narrowly; exemption limited to religious periodicals “effectively endorses 
religious belief”). Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Winn recognized this much. See Winn, 131 
S. Ct. at 1440 (noting that Article III standing can arise through the “costs and benefits . . . 
result[ing] from alleged discrimination in the tax code, such as when the availability of a 
tax exemption is conditioned on religious affiliation”). Although outside the scope of this 
Article, an interesting question is whether this might leave the traditional Article III door 
open for parents denied tuition support under the Arizona program. 
242 E.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 295 (2000) (government 
sanctioned prayer before public high school football games); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 
488, 495 (1961) (government mandated religious loyalty oaths); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 
U.S. 306, 314 (1952) (government sanctioned religious release time). 
243 E.g., Pleasant Grove v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 460 (2009) (public park display of 
Ten Commandments); McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (courthouse 
display of Ten Commandments); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 692 (2005) (same); 
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 671 (1984) (public holiday displays). 
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actual or symbolic relationships between government and religion.244 
Indeed, the possibility of a taxpayer-only legal landscape in the 
Establishment Clause area is so rare that Justice Kagan failed to 
provide a single example of such a case. (Surely the merits of a school 
choice program like that in Winn was not such a case, in light of 
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris.)245 
This rarity is evident when analyzing the hypotheticals posed by 
the Winn dissent to confirm their fears that, in the direct-spending-
versus-tax-credit situation, no one will have standing because “no one 
other than taxpayers has suffered the injury necessary to challenge 
government sponsorship of religion.”246 Justice Kagan paints a 
scenario wherein a state legislature gives $500 annually to Jewish 
citizens as a reward “for their religious devotion,” either through an 
annual stipend or by “allow[ing] Jews to claim the aid on their tax 
returns,” and concludes that because taxpayers’ economic concerns 
would be identical under the Establishment Clause, “[t]heir access to 
the federal courts should not depend on which type of financial 
subsidy the State has offered.”247 
But if the stake is access to court, Justice Kagan paints outside the 
lines. While the standing of her hypothetical plaintiffs might be 
somewhat related to taxing and spending,248 the injury-in-fact is that a 
non-Jewish plaintiff is being taxed while the Jewish person is not. As 
such, the legal claim is premised on the argument that no rational 
basis exists for differentiating between the taxpaying plaintiff and the 
 
244 E.g., Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 690 
(1994) (holding that statute creating special school district coinciding with boundaries of 
single religious group constitutes unconstitutional aid under Establishment Clause); NLRB 
v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 491 (1979) (involving nonentanglement claim 
involving Catholic Church’s challenge to National Labor Relations Act jurisdictional 
provision implicating Catholic high school teachers); Zorach, 343 U.S. at 308 
(Establishment Clause challenge to religious “released time” program at public school, as 
creating a symbiotic relationship between church and state). Cf. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 
83, 133 (1968), (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“The recent history of this Court is replete with 
illustrations, . . . that questions involving the religious clauses will not, if federal taxpayers 
are prevented from contesting federal expenditures, be left ‘unacknowledged, unresolved, 
and undecided.’”). 
245 536 U.S. 639, 653–55 (2002) (upholding Ohio’s need-based school voucher 
program against Establishment Clause attack, where “state aid reaches religious schools 
solely as a result of the numerous independent decisions of private individuals”). 
246 Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1451, 1457–58 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
247 Id. at 1457. 
248 Because Justice Kagan does not specify whether a compelled-exaction is involved, 
it is difficult to decipher whether the hypothetical lends itself to a Flast analysis in the first 
instance. 
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Jew, making the spending unconstitutional (here, as a denominational 
preference) under the Equal Protection Clause.249 A similar 
conclusion applies to Justice Kagan’s tax credit for purchasing 
crucifixes from the government, or her “Jewish reward” if obtained as 
an exemption.250 The prospective plaintiff in these cases would 
simply need to donate money to any charity (religious or otherwise) 
and claim the credit on her tax form equal to that as if she were 
Jewish or it were akin to a crucifix purchase. Under Justice Kagan’s 
hypothetical, the Internal Revenue Service would thereafter disallow 
the plaintiff’s deduction because the payment is not actually for 
crucifixes or to a Jewish institution. The plaintiff could then bring an 
Establishment Clause suit under Texas Monthly v. Bullock,251  or raise 
an equal protection claim because the government lacks a rational 
basis (or an intermediate or strict scrutiny basis) to treat the plaintiff’s 
desired charity different from the crucifix payment or Jewish 
institution.252 Because a traditional Article III injury exists in each of 
these cases, the plaintiff(s) would not need to rely on the narrow Flast 
exception to raise their claims. Creating an entirely separate basis for 
taxpayer standing would be unnecessary and add little to the 
constitutional calculus. Thus it is simply inaccurate to conclude, as 
the dissent did, that Winn “insulate[s government’s] financing of 
religious activity from legal challenge.”253 
 
249 See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (holding that 
Equal Protection Clause prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion); Lupu & Tuttle, 
supra note 129, at 135 (explaining that a government’s sectarian preference in distributing 
benefits violates the Equal Protection Clause). 
250 See Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1457. 
251 489 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1989) (plurality opinion) (tax exemption for religious property 
violates the Establishment Clause if drawn too narrowly; exemption limited to religious 
periodicals “effectively endorses religious belief”). 
252 In the “Jewish Reward” example, if the government’s action is underinclusive—i.e., 
providing tax credits or deductions only to one religious organization, it presents a Texas 
Monthly problem. See id. Furthermore, in the crucifix case, a member of a religion that 
does not recognize the crucifix (or specifically rejects it and/or is offended by it) could 
allege an independent Establishment Clause claim based on the offense to his or her 
sensibilities or on the “outsider alienation” theory. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 
668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (explaining that government action endorsing 
religion violates the Establishment Clause because it “sends a message to nonadherents 
that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community”). Such an injury is 
sufficient to trigger Article III standing in the cases dealing with the government’s display 
of religious symbols. See, e.g., McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 850 (2005); Van 
Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681–82 (2005); Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 578–79 
(1989). These claims need not rely on the narrow taxpayer standing exception to proceed. 
253 Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1461 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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The Winn dissent took great umbrage at the prospect that state 
legislatures might use a tax credit to reach a result that might be held 
unconstitutional if accomplished through direct spending.254 This 
complaint has common-sense appeal, as explained below.255 
However, as a doctrinal matter, it improperly equates private choice 
with that of the government.256 Justice Kagan speculates that no 
legislature will ever spend government money to support religion 
when it can use tax credits to achieve the same result. The 
counterargument, however, is that such a decision is one for the 
political branches, whose fast constitutionalism must be pursued at 
peril of electoral defeat.257 
It may also be shortsighted to predict that state legislatures will 
now simply spend through tax credits rather than direct expenditures 
“to preclude taxpayer challenges to state funding of religion.”258 This 
will not insulate taxpayer standing challenges in state court. Because 
states are not constrained by Article III,259  they can create standing 
 
254 Id. at 1462 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s opinion . . . offers a roadmap—
more truly, just a one-step instruction—to any government that wishes to insulate its 
financing of religious activity from legal challenge. Structure the funding as a tax 
expenditure, and Flast will not stand in the way.”); id. at 1450 (“From now on, the 
government need follow just one simple rule—subsidize through the tax system—to 
preclude taxpayer challenges to state funding of religion.”). 
255 See infra Part IV.A. 
256 See supra Part III.A.3. 
257 Justice Kennedy appeared to recognize this much in his concurring opinion in Hein. 
See Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587, 618 (2007) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (“It must be remembered that, even where parties have no standing to sue, 
members of the Legislative and Executive Branches are not excused from making 
constitutional determinations in the regular course of their duties. Government officials 
must make a conscious decision to obey the Constitution whether or not their acts can be 
challenged in a court of law and then must conform their actions to these principled 
determinations.”). Richard C. Shragger, The Relative Irrelevance of the Establishment 
Clause, 89 TEX. L. REV. 583, 650 (2011) (“Lack of judicial enforcement does not relieve 
the political branches of their duty to obey the Constitution. . . .”). But see New York v. 
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (O’Connor, J.) (appearing to recognize the inherent 
power of a legislature to remain inert, even in the face of constitutional violations). The 
court’s potential role may, however, color its political decision making, as I explain below. 
See infra Part IV.C. 
258 Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1450. 
259 ASARCO v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) (“[T]he constraints of Article III do 
not apply to state courts, and accordingly the state courts are not bound by the limitations 
of a case or controversy or other federal rules of justiciability even when they address 
issues of federal law, as when they are called upon to interpret the Constitution or, in this 
case, a federal statute.”); see also G. ALAN TARR & MARY CORNELIA ALDIS PORTER, 
STATE SUPREME COURTS IN STATE AND NATION 43 (1988) (noting a study which found 
that “thirty-four states permit taxpayers’ suits to challenge state government action”). But 
see Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial 
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doctrines to suit their own institutions. Furthermore, as Professor 
Zelinsky recently pointed out, because most state courts have more 
liberal taxpayer standing doctrines than do their federal counterparts, 
Winn will not preclude taxpayer challenges to state funding systems, 
but rather, simply channel them from federal courts to state courts.260 
This is a small, but meaningful, gain for proponents of a broader 
taxpayer standing doctrine, particularly when considering that Flast 
may not apply to state taxpayers in federal court in the first place. 
4. The Flast Exception Does Not Apply to State Taxpayers in Federal 
Court 
Professor Zelinsky has persuasively explained how the decisions in 
Cuno and Winn will channel state tax credit challenges to state courts, 
which will develop a freestanding body of state law governing tax 
credits and exemptions beyond direct review by the Supreme 
Court.261 He concludes that this body of law, while more likely to 
recognize taxpayer or citizen standing, will also “be more permissive 
toward state policies than would a comparable corpus of cases 
decided by federal judges.”262 
As it pertains to the taxpayer standing doctrine as a whole, I 
believe Cuno does more than that, and that the Winn Court erred in 
applying the Flast test in the first place. Notwithstanding this error, 
Hein and Cuno support the conclusion that the Flast exception is not 
available to state taxpayers in federal court. Thus, while the Winn 
dissenters outline a blueprint for state legislatures to ensure that 
“Flast will not stand in the way” to taxpayer standing in federal 
court,263 it likely never has. 
 
Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1852–59 (2001) (explaining that some states have 
now adopted standing doctrines similar to that provided by Article III). 
260 Zelinsky, Driver’s Seat, supra note 199, at 47–52. 
261 Id. Such a system would be beyond direct review by the Supreme Court in light of 
its taxpayer standing jurisprudence. This would not be a novel circumstance. See, e.g., 
Kadish, 490 U.S. at 636–37 (treating as nonjusticiable certain advisory opinions issued by 
state courts on questions of federal constitutional law). 
262 Zelinsky, Driver’s Seat, supra note 199, at 64; see also, e.g., Perry v. Brown, 671 
F.3d 1052, 1074 (9th Cir. 2012) (“State courts may afford litigants standing to appear 
where federal courts would not . . . .”). 
263 Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1462 (Kagan, J., dissenting). (“The Court’s opinion . . . offers a 
roadmap—more truly, just a one-step instruction—to any government that wishes to 
insulate its financing of religious activity from legal challenge. Structure the funding as a 
tax expenditure, and Flast will not stand in the way.”). Justice Kagan uses the term “tax 
expenditure” to include tax credits, exemptions, and the like. See supra note 197. 
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In Cuno, the Court unanimously reaffirmed that the Frothingham 
rule against federal taxpayer standing “applies with undiminished 
force to state taxpayers” who challenge “state tax or spending 
decisions simply by virtue of their status as taxpayers.”264 The Court, 
however, has never specifically decided whether state taxpayers 
might otherwise have Article III standing to raise Establishment 
Clause challenges in federal court—i.e., if their taxpayer status could 
qualify as a direct, concrete Article III injury.265  If the answer is yes, 
there would be no need to apply an exception to the rule against 
taxpayer standing, as the rule would perforce not apply to them. If the 
 
264 DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 345, 346 (2006) (“We indicated as 
much in Doremus v. Board of Ed. of Hawthorne, 342 U.S. 429 (1952).”); see also id. at 
346 (“[S]tate taxpayers have no standing under Article III to challenge state tax or 
spending decisions simply by virtue of their status as taxpayers.”). In Cuno, the state 
plaintiffs alleged standing for Commerce Clause challenges based solely on their status as 
Ohio taxpayers. Id. at 338. Not unlike the plaintiffs in Winn, their alleged injury was that 
franchise tax credits provided to DaimlerChrysler depleted Ohio’s available revenues. See 
id. at 339 n.2 (noting state taxpayers’ argument that tax benefits for DaimlerChrysler 
“diminished the funds available to the . . . State, imposing a ‘disproportionate burden’ on 
plaintiffs”). Just as in Doremus, the Court held that the interests of a taxpayer in the 
moneys of the state treasury “are too indeterminable, remote, uncertain and indirect’ to 
support standing to challenge ‘their manner of expenditure.’” Id. at 345 (quoting Doremus, 
342 U.S. at 433) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
265 While the Supreme Court has never squarely considered or decided state taxpayer 
standing to raise Establishment Clause challenges in federal court, it has, in a small group 
of cases over sixty years, assumed that such plaintiffs had Article III standing in the cases 
before it. I count eighteen such cases. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 648 
(2002); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (plurality opinion); Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas 
Joel Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 694 n.2 (1994); Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. 
Ball, 473 U.S 373 (1985), overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); March v. 
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 n.4 (1983); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 392 (1983); 
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 232 (1977); Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works of Md., 426 
U.S. 736, 744 (1976); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 355 n.5 (1975), overruled by 
Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 808; Griggs v. Pub. Funds for Pub. Schs. of N.J., 417 U.S. 961 
(1974) (mem. op.); Marburger v. Pub. Funds for Pub. Schs. of N.J., 417 U.S. 961 (1974) 
(mem. op.); Levitt v. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472, 478 
(1973); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 735 (1973); Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious 
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 762 (1973); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 827 (1973); 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 611 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 
664, 666 (1970). 
 In not one of these cases, however, did the Court analyze, or even meaningfully discuss, 
the issue of state taxpayer standing under Article III, much less whether the Flast 
exception would apply to state taxpayer Establishment Clause claims in federal court. This 
list does not include cases that involved state taxpayers on a direct financial basis, rather 
than solely by virtue of their status as indirect, dissenting taxpayers. See Tex. Monthly v. 
Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1989) (plurality opinion) (finding state taxpayer standing in an 
action challenging sales tax exemption provided by Texas statute for religious periodicals 
where plaintiff sought a refund of nearly $150,000 in sale taxes paid under protest). 
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answer is no, the unanimous rationale in Cuno would apply,266 and 
state taxpayers raising Establishment Clause challenges in federal 
court would be left arguing that the Flast exception also applies to 
them.267 
After Hein, however, those taxpayers cannot benefit from the Flast 
exception because it is plain that “the results in Flast”268 do not 
extend to state taxpayers. As explained above, the results in Flast 
were that injured federal taxpayer plaintiffs could raise an 
Establishment Clause challenge to Congress’s Article I, Section 8 
taxing and spending power creating a federal law to disburse federal 
funds in support of religion.269 Indeed, under the very terms of the 
Flast test, state taxpayer plaintiffs have standing to assert 
Establishment Clause challenges “only [to] exercises of congressional 
power under the taxing and spending clause of Art. I, § 8, of the 
Constitution.”270  Use of other powers by Congress, actions by the 
executive branch, or that of state governments, do not suffice.271 This 
is because these other avenues could not give rise to “the specific 
evils feared by [the Framers]”—that “congressional power under the 
taxing and spending clause” of Article I, Section 8 “would be used to 
favor one religion over another or to support religion in general.”272 
Because the Establishment Clause did not apply to the states until it 
 
266 See Cuno, 547 U.S. at 345 (holding that the “rationale for rejecting federal taxpayer 
standing applies with undiminished force to state taxpayers”). 
267 Cf. Perry, 671 F.3d at 1074 (“State courts may afford litigants standing to appear 
where federal courts would not, but whether they do so has no bearing on the parties’ 
Article III standing in federal court.”). 
268 Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587, 610 (2007) (quoting United 
States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 196 (1974)) (emphasis omitted). 
269 See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103 (1968); supra Parts II.B.1–4. 
270 Flast, 392 U.S. at 102, 105 (emphasis added); see also id. at 102–03 (explaining that 
part two of the test requires a showing that the challenged activity exceeds “specific 
constitutional limitations imposed upon the exercise of the congressional taxing and 
spending power” (emphasis added)). 
271 See Hein, 551 U.S. at 608–10 (no taxpayer standing to challenge executive branch 
discretionary spending as violating the Establishment Clause and “no taxpayer standing to 
sue under Free Exercise Clause of First Amendment” (citing Tilton v. Richardson, 403 
U.S. 672, 689 (1971))); see also Cuno, 547 U.S. at 343–44 (no state taxpayer standing to 
sue under Commerce Clause); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation 
of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 479–82 (1982) (no taxpayer standing to challenge 
executive branch action taken pursuant to Property Clause of Article IV); Schlesinger v. 
Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 228 (1974) (no taxpayer standing to sue 
under Incompatibility Clause of Article I); Richardson, 418 U.S. at 175 (no taxpayer 
standing to sue under Statement and Account Clause of Article I). 
272 Flast, 392 U.S. at 102-03 (emphasis added).  
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was incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment,273  the substantive 
rationale behind Flast—i.e., the “specific evils feared by the 
Framers”—does not fit the actions of state governments.274 Arizona’s 
tax credit program, then, fails to meet the terms or substantive 
rationale of the Flast exception. It was not a product of the federal 
taxing and spending power275 and had nothing to do with 
Congress.276 
Accordingly, relative to a Flast-like exception, Cuno and Winn do 
more than simply channel state tax credit disputes to state courts. 
Those decisions force all state taxpaying plaintiffs to rely on state 
law, in state court, to obtain taxpayer standing to attack state tax 
credit programs on Establishment Clause grounds. Whether this can 
be remedied, and how, are topics to which I now turn. 
IV 
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE TAXPAYER STANDING ALTERNATIVES 
On a doctrinal level, the Winn dissent erred by trying to fit third-
party state tax credit challenges into the narrow Flast exception. This 
is impossible without moving beyond “the results in Flast.”277 Winn 
concludes that there is a legal distinction between direct expenditures 
and tax credits, even if their economics overlap. Cuno and Hein 
remove Flast from the state taxpayer’s quiver. However, neither of 
these conclusions addresses, on a policy level, Justice Kagan’s 
concerns that state and federal governments weary of Establishment 
 
273 See Everson v. Bd of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
274 See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 41 (1998). The obvious 
counterarguments here are that the rights of conscience predates the structural no-
establishment principle and only the latter was originally intended to bind the national 
government but not the states. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 37, at 371 (explaining that the 
freedom of conscience “has a strong claim to being ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history 
and tradition’” (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977))). 
275 Nor could the argument be made that Arizona’s taxing and spending power was the 
same as that of Congress. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, with ARIZ. CONST. art. IX, § 3. 
276 The Flast exception does not result in the unenforceability of the Establishment 
Clause against the states—claims under the Clause can still be made by plaintiffs in a 
variety of ways, see supra notes 272-75 and accompanying text, and by state taxpayers in 
state court. See, e.g., Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606 (Ariz. 1999); Zelinsky, Driver’s 
Seat, supra note 199, at 47–52. In this regard, Flast simply removes federal courts as a 
potential forum to raise state taxpayer-only claims. 
277 Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587, 610 (specifically adopting 
Justice Powell’s concurring opinion in United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 196 
(1974)), which “limit[ed] the expansion of federal taxpayer and citizen standing . . . ‘to an 
outer boundary drawn by the results in Flast’” (quoting Richardson, 418 U.S. at 196) 
(emphasis added by Hein Court)); see supra Parts II, III.B.4. 
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Clause taxpayer challenges can simply launder direct financial aid to 
religion by using tax credits in lieu of direct appropriations.278 Such a 
result, though doctrinally outside Flast, appears analytically 
troublesome considering that the structural limitations imposed on 
government by the Establishment Clause would seem to protect both 
forms of action.279 Of course, because a traditional Article III injury 
exists in many of these instances, taxpayer plaintiffs will not need to 
rely on the Flast exception to raise their claims.280 Thus, the problem 
is not as widespread as Justice Kagan insists. 
But Justice Kagan is technically correct that this option is not 
available for every potential taxpayer plaintiff. Those left outside the 
courthouse are likely to argue that strikingly similar taxing and 
spending policies executed in slightly different ways should not have 
different constitutional consequences. A majority of the Court, 
however, is unlikely to merge the Article III treatment of tax practices 
it specifically set apart in Cuno and Winn. Disappointed plaintiffs will 
need to either wait out a change in the Court’s composition, or find 
other ways to create taxpayer standing in federal court. 
A. Abandon the Rule Against Taxpayer Standing? 
The easiest solution would be to abandon the rule against taxpayer 
standing. Federal courts could treat the Establishment Clause as both 
the source of the right and the substantive description of those entitled 
to enforce it, and simply ask whether the plaintiff states a claim 
arising under that right.281 Such an approach would sidestep the 
standing requirement and alleviate the enforcement problem often 
 
278 See Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1450–51, 1462–63 
(2011); cf. Siegel, supra note 2, at 107 (“Standing doctrine should turn on real distinctions, 
not on gestures designed to propitiate the gods of justiciability.”). 
279 Marshall & Nichol, supra note 24, at 237, 251–52. 
280 See supra Part III.C.3. 
281 Cf. Fletcher, supra note 234, at 223 (“[S]tanding should simply be a question on the 
merits of plaintiff’s claim.”); see also id. at 290–91 (“[W]e should ask, as a question of 
law on the merits, whether the plaintiff has the right to enforce the particular legal duty in 
question.”). Professor Sunstein has similarly argued that the standing doctrine is used, 
improperly, as substitute for the question whether the plaintiff has a cause of action, and 
should therefore be discarded. See generally Sunstein, What’s Standing, supra note 43. He 
views injury-in-fact as “neither a necessary nor a sufficient element.” Id. at 182 (arguing 
that the principal question for standing should be “whether the law ha[s] conferred a cause 
of action”); see also Mark Tushnet, Foreward: The New Constitutional Order and the 
Chastening of Constitutional Aspiration, 113 HARV. L. REV. 29 (1999) (advocating a 
presumption in favor of standing); Nichol, Jr., supra note 9, at 338–40 (advocating federal 
court assume standing unless strong reasons exist for denying it). 
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posed by the Clause, which does not lend itself to an individual-rights 
analysis akin to the rest of the Bill of Rights.282 This suggested route, 
however, requires a suspension of both stare decisis and reality,283 as 
the Court has consistently resisted calls to expand or abandon its 
taxpayer standing doctrine and nothing suggests an about-face.284 The 
narrow Flast exception to the Frothingham rule is well-settled 
standing law and, barring a shift in the Court’s makeup, it is here to 
stay. 
B. Broader Taxpayer Standing by Statute Supported by Legislative 
Findings? 
The surprising doctrinal stability of the rule against taxpayer 
standing,285 coupled with the Court’s reluctance to alter its 
jurisprudence in this area,286 could push proponents of a broader 
doctrine to the political branches. Recognizing the Court’s reticence, 
Congress might take various steps to create standing to raise 
Establishment Clause challenges to tax credits (and exemptions) of 
the sort encountered in Winn.287 Much like it considered in the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965,288 Congress could 
 
282 See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, The Procedural Annihilation of Structural Rights, 61 
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 10–11 (2009); cf. AMAR, supra note 274, at 32–42, 246–57; Ira C. Lupu 
& Robert W. Tuttle, Federalism and Faith, 56 EMORY L.J. 19, 23–24 (2006); Ira C. Lupu, 
Federalism and Faith Redux, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 935, 937–42 (2010) (citing, 
inter alia, Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 49–50 (2004) (Thomas, 
J., concurring in the judgment)) (arguing that, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, “[t]he 
Establishment Clause does not purport to protect individual rights”). 
283 Pushaw, “Accidental” Plaintiffs, supra note 28, at 105 (noting that while many 
scholars have “urge[d] the Court to abandon or overhaul the entire [standing] doctrine, . . . 
stare decisis makes such proposals utopian”). 
284 See supra Parts II-III, and cases cited supra note 13. The Court has, however, 
abandoned the traditional standing doctrine in certain limited areas, such as in various 
Fourth Amendment contexts. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140 (1978) 
(“dispensing with the rubric of standing” when deciding whether a criminal defendant can 
raise a violation of the Fourth Amendment’s search and seizure provisions). 
285 See supra Parts II–III. 
286 See supra Parts II–III. 
287 Cf. Heather Elliott, Congress’s Inability to Solve Standing Problems, 91 B.U. L. 
REV. 159, 182–225 (2011) [hereinafter Elliott, Standing Problems] (outlining various 
Congressional options to broaden the tripartite standing doctrine, including providing 
standing by statute, conferring bounties to prevailing plaintiffs, or providing for non-
Article III tribunals). It should be noted that prior to suggesting these fixes, Professor 
Elliott specifically assumes, for the sake of her argument, that the modern standing 
doctrine is overly restrictive. Id. at 181. 
288 Both the House and Senate considered amendments to the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act that would have authorized such challenges. See 111 CONG. 
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enact legislation expressly authorizing taxpayer standing for third-
party dissenting taxpayer plaintiffs in an attempt to constitutionalize 
broader harm than that recognized by the Court.289  Such a statute 
might read as follows: 
A case or controversy within the meaning of Article III of the 
Constitution exists whenever a plaintiff taxpayer [of the United 
States/State of X] presents a First Amendment Establishment Clause 
challenge to [Tax Credit Act Y] if, assuming the challenged tax 
credit was a direct government expenditure, that taxpayer would 
otherwise have standing under the taxpayer standing exception 
enunciated in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
This statute would have provided taxpayer standing to the plaintiffs 
in Winn. Unfortunately, it is likely to be held unconstitutional at the 
federal level. The Supreme Court has consistently held that 
congressional grants of standing suffice only to remove prudential 
barriers to standing.290  They cannot remove the limits imposed by the 
case-or-controversy requirement of Article III,291 which includes the 
 
REC. 5771, 5942–43 (1965) (rejected by House); id. 7345 (rejected by Senate); see also id. 
5973, 6132, 7316–7318 (debate on the topic). 
289 Some noted legal scholars have gone even further, suggesting that Congress could, 
through substantive legislation, create legislative standing in order to effectuate the 
substantive goal. See, e.g., Sunstein, What’s Standing, supra note 43, at 230–36 (locating 
source of such congressional authority in Article III; proposing a “bounty system” in cases 
involving private defendants and the executive branch); Daan Braveman, The Standing 
Doctrine: A Dialogue Between the Court and Congress, 2 CARDOZO L. REV. 31, 39 
(1980) (locating the source of such congressional authority in Article III); Mark Tushnet, 
The New Law of Standing: A Plea for Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 663, 670–71 
(1977) (similar; locating congressional authority in Necessary and Proper Clause of Article 
I, Section 8). 
290 See, e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 163 (1997) (“Congress legislates against 
the background of our prudential standing doctrine, which applies unless it is expressly 
negated.”). This Article does not enter the debate of whether the bar on generalized 
grievances is rooted in the separation of powers doctrine or some other, more malleable 
source, such that it cannot be overcome by Congress. 
291 See, e.g., Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1151 (2009); Raines v. 
Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 n.3 (1997) (“It is settled that Congress cannot erase Article III’s 
standing requirements by statutorily granting the right to sue to a plaintiff who would not 
otherwise have standing.” (quoting Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 
100 (1979) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 100 (“Congress 
may, by legislation, expand standing to the full extent permitted by Art. III, thus 
permitting litigation by one ‘who otherwise would be barred by prudential standing rules.’ 
In no event, however, may Congress abrogate the Art. III minima . . . .” (quoting Warth v. 
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975))); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 n.3 (1972) 
(“[W]here a dispute is otherwise justiciable, the question whether the litigant is a ‘proper 
party to request an adjudication of a particular issue’ is one within the power of Congress 
to determine.” (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 100 (1968) (emphasis added)). 
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general prohibition on taxpayer standing.292 Thus, as scholars have 
generally noted, statutory standing would do nothing to remove the 
barrier that taxpayers (among other plaintiffs) face under the modern 
tripartite standing doctrine, which the Supreme Court locates in 
Article III itself.293 
Nor can Congress likely accomplish the same under the guise of 
legislative “fact finding,” whereby it would articulate—or “find”—
that particular taxpayer harms are sufficient to meet the strictures of 
Article III.294 First, the Court is unlikely to treat such activity by 
Congress as legislative fact-finding. Creating a legislative record of 
“facts” is often no more than the political art of ladling into the record 
the favorable quotes of tame witnesses made during staged hearings 
in order to support substantive legislation.295 This is distinguishable 
from trying to conclusively establish jurisdictional facts for a pre-
existing legal test fashioned by the Supreme Court. Defining what 
type of taxpayer injuries are justiciable smacks of a finding of law on 
the legal issue of whether there exists a constitutional “case” or 
“controversy” sufficient to provide the court with subject matter 
jurisdiction. This, of course, is the Judiciary’s domain.296 
 
292 See Flast, 392 U.S. at 102 (explaining that question of whether plaintiffs may sue 
based solely on their capacity as taxpayers “turns on whether they can demonstrate the 
necessary stake as taxpayers in the outcome of the litigation to satisfy Article III 
requirements” (emphasis added)); see cases cited supra note 61. 
293 Elliott, Standing Problems, supra note 287, at 183. The Supreme Court has not 
shied from this conclusion. See, e.g., Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 
529 U.S. 765, 771 (2000); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). But see Robert J. 
Pushaw, Jr., Article III’s Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions of Federal 
Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 449–51 (1994) (arguing that the Court 
misinterpreted the “case” or “controversy” language of Article III when creating the 
tripartite standing test). 
294 See generally Elliott, Standing Problems, supra note 287, at 182–83 (citing, inter 
alia, Braveman, supra note 289, at 38–39); James Dumont, Beyond Standing: Proposals 
for Congressional Response to Supreme Court “Standing” Decisions, 13 VT. L. REV. 675, 
678–81 (1989); Sunstein, What’s Standing, supra note 43, at 230; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: Standing as a Judicially Imposed Limit on Legislative 
Power, 42 DUKE L.J. 1170, 1181–82 (1993). 
295 Bryan Dearinger, The State of the Nation, Not the State of the Record: Finding 
Problems with Judicial “Review” of Eleventh Amendment Abrogation Legislation, 53 
DRAKE L. REV. 421, 474 (2005). 
296 See Elliott, Standing Problems, supra note 287, at 192–93 (“It is almost 
inconceivable . . . that the Court would accept congressional efforts to redefine the 
constitutional limits of standing. . . . If Congress were to enact statutes that purport to alter 
outcomes under the tripartite test, it would be rewriting Article III, something the Court 
has made clear that it cannot do.”) (internal citations omitted)); cf. Shirley S. Abrahamson 
& Robert L. Hughes, Shall We Dance? Steps for Legislators and Judges in Statutory 
Interpretation, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1045, 1092 (1991) (“Simply put, the legislature’s 
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Second, even if the Supreme Court were to treat this behavior as 
legislative fact-finding, it likely would chew up Congress’s “facts” 
and spit them out over the “hard floor of Article III”297 that has 
defined the standing doctrine for forty years.298 As I have explained 
in a previous work, the Court has become increasingly skeptical of 
Congress’s fact-finding in support of prophylactic legislation.299 
While the Court has explained “that ‘Congress need [not] make 
particularized findings in order to legislate[,]’”300 it has, since the late 
1990s, jealously guarded its constitutional prerogative to “say what 
the law is,”301 no matter how mild the threat or the applicable 
standard of review.302 The question of Article III standing fits 
squarely within the judicial review rubric of Marbury because the 
Court is saying “what the law is” with respect to the scope of its 
Article III judicial power, in that it declares the law to be that the 
 
responsibility in the United States’ system of government is to enact statutes. The court’s 
responsibility is to interpret and apply the statutes to resolve disputes.”); see also, e.g., 
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 219–34 (1995) (similar). 
297 Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1151 (2009). 
298 I speak here of the cases solidifying the “irreducible minimum” of the tripartite test. 
See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, 
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982); Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 
(1979); Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976). 
299 Dearinger, supra note 295, at 458–62. 
300 Id. at 438 n.75 (quoting Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 156 (1971)); see also 
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 21 (2005); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562 
(1995). 
301 Dearinger, supra note 295, at 440–61; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 
177 (1803). 
302 Dearinger, supra note 295, at 454–62 (chronicling the Court’s heightened scrutiny 
and increased distrust of congressional findings in the context of legislation enacted 
pursuant to Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, after nearly fifty years of 
consistently granting enormous deference to Congress in this area). Compare Katzenbach 
v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 653 (1966) (“It was for Congress, as the branch that made this 
judgment, to assess and weigh the . . . risk or pervasiveness of the discrimination in 
governmental services, the effectiveness of eliminating [a state’s discrimination] as a 
means of dealing with the evil . . . . It is not for us to review the congressional resolution 
of these factors.”), with Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 729 (2003) 
(demanding that “Congress [physically] evidence . . . a pattern of constitutional violations 
on the part of the States in th[e] area” sought to be remedied by the use of Section 5 
legislation). Unsurprisingly, the majority of scholars who advocated for a deferential 
standard of review of non-prudential statutory standing did so prior to the Court’s modern 
hostility toward legislative findings related to constitutional violations, beginning with 
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). Compare Dearinger, supra note 295, at 
454–62, with Pierce, Jr., supra note 294, at 1181–82 (suggesting rational basis review for 
congressional findings creating statutory standing), and Sunstein, What’s Standing, supra 
note 43, at 230 (“Perhaps courts will review . . . [findings of causation and redressability] 
under a deferential standard.”). 
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plaintiff cannot raise the substantive constitutional claim in federal 
court.303 The Court’s recent willingness, in the context of anti-
discrimination laws enacted under Section Five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, to critique documented congressional findings of 
discrimination as “isolated,” “anecdotal,” or “conjectural”304 transfers 
easily to the standing doctrines, where subjective judgments abound 
and strict scrutiny does not apply.305 Indeed, rejecting legislative 
findings supporting the expansion of Article III standing is a far less 
intrusive judicial act than critiquing findings made to protect suspect 
classifications or fundamental rights. 
But when faced with the alternatives, placing the keys of taxpayer 
standing in the Supreme Court’s hands might be the best—or least 
worst—alternative. At times, Congress has proven that its judgment 
as to the propriety of statutory standing is not as finely calibrated as 
its proponents like to suggest. Remember that Congress dispensed 
with statutory standing in the statute under attack in Flast itself,306 
only to later receive a reprieve from the Court.307 
Nor does Congress always endeavor to stay scrupulously within the 
confines of the Constitution when enacting legislation.308 Few would 
 
303 Cf. John G. Roberts, Jr., Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 DUKE. L.J. 
1219, 1229 (1993) (“In the first place, the legislature is not supreme in our system of 
government—the Constitution is. Holding a statute unconstitutional because it transgresses 
Article III is nothing more than a recognition of that principle—a principle the Supreme 
Court has felt obligated to defend since the first case holding an Act of Congress 
unconstitutional under Article III.”). 
304 See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 369–72 (2001); 
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 89–91 (2000). But see Miss. Univ. for Women 
v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 732 (1982); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976); 
Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 651. 
305 See supra Part I. This may even be true on the merits in particular Religion Clause 
challenges as well. See, e.g., Schwartzman, supra note 103, at 381 (noting that the Court 
has “applied much weaker forms of review” in compelled-support cases (citing David B. 
Gaebler, First Amendment Protection Against Government Compelled Expression and 
Association, 23 B.C. L. REV. 995, 1014–17 (1982))). 
306 See 111 CONG. REC. 5771, 5942–43 (rejected by House); id. 7345 (rejected by 
Senate); see also id. 5973, 6132, 7316–7318 (debate on the topic). 
307 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102–06 (1968). 
308 See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Is Congress Capable of Conscientious, Responsible 
Constitutional Interpretation? Some Notes on Congressional Capacity to Interpret the 
Constitution, 89 B.U. L. REV. 499, 503–04 (2009) (“Knowing the courts are available to 
correct (some of) their constitutional errors, legislators have little incentive to expend great 
effort in enacting only constitutionally permissible statutes.”). Professor Tushnet refers to 
this as “judicial overhang.” MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS: JUDICIAL 
REVIEW AND SOCIAL WELFARE RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 81 
(2008) (“The judicial overhang sometimes promotes legislative disregard of the 
constitution.”); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 
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commit to respecting its constitutional judgments the same way we do 
the Court’s. As others have examined, the importance of reelection 
may make Congress content to manufacture a judicial controversy in 
order to avoid a political one,309 or otherwise refuse to play any 
meaningful role in hard constitutionalism. Such delegations to or 
conscriptions of the Judiciary could be accomplished by practicing 
“anticipatory obedience” regarding Article III standing questions,310 
or by enacting the expansive statutory standing provision outlined 
above, knowing full well that the Court would find it 
unconstitutional.311 Alternatively, legislators can remain inert, 
publically grounding their decision not to support the substantive 
legislation on the standing provision’s certain demise in federal 
court.312 Either way, members of Congress wishing to support or 
attack constitutionalizing tax credits for religious schools can do so 
while avoiding negative electoral consequences, knowing full well 
that the Judiciary must play referee.313 “Fuzzy, leave-the-details-to-
 
58–65 (1999) [hereinafter TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION] (similar). At least one 
scholar has explained how Congress’s use of the Supreme Court as a “release valve” for 
majoritarian preferences will lead to what she calls “upside-down” majoritarian style of 
judicial review that covers for the increasingly inert or non-majoritarian political branches. 
Corinna Barrett Lain, Upside-Down Judicial Review, 101 GEO. L.J. 113, 179–81 (2012). 
But see Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. U. 
L. REV. 549, 568 (2009) (“However, every Congressional enactment passed under the 
commerce power, and every appropriation under the General Welfare Clause, involves an 
implicit interpretation of these clauses, whether or not any court ever considers them.”). 
309 See Elliott, Standing Lessons, supra note 31, at 499. 
310 See Mark Tushnet, Evaluating Congressional Constitutional Interpretation: Some 
Criteria and Two Informal Case Studies, in CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION 271 (Neal 
Devins & Keith E. Whittington eds., 2005) (noting instances where Congress has 
“adapt[ed legislation] to ensure that it will survive judicial scrutiny” in well-settled areas 
of law). 
311 Cf. TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION supra note 308, at 59–61 (concluding 
that congressional disinterest or irresponsible legislation are effects of judicial overhang). 
Sometimes, not even the prospect of unconstitutional laws can change this behavior. See 
supra notes 306–07. 
312 Cf. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (O’Connor, J.) (appearing to 
recognize the inherent power of a legislature to remain inert, even in the face of 
constitutional violations). 
313 Or, more specifically, federal appellate courts. Cf. Maxwell L. Stearns, The 
Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, 103 YALE L.J. 1219, 1288 (1994) (“Legislatures, 
like private markets, can cycle, especially when allocating the benefits of capital gains or 
the burdens of capital losses. In those situations, legislatures may opt for inaction, leaving 
the status quo by default.”); id. (“Unlike legislatures, however, appellate courts do not 
have the option of declining to resolve necessary issues contained in cases properly 
presented for review. As a result, their decisional processes must be structured to ensure an 
outcome in every case.”); cf. Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of 
Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 605 (1995) (noting 
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be-sorted-out-by-the-courts legislation is attractive to the 
Congressman who wants credit for addressing a national problem but 
does not have the time (or perhaps the votes) to grapple with the nitty-
gritty.”314 What is more, “activist judges” are perfect scapegoats 
because they cannot bite back.315 Accordingly, Congress’s political 
and cyclical nature, leading to its tendency to conscript or blame the 
Judiciary, provides a practical reason why the courts might be the best 
place to protect the purpose and consistency of the taxpayer standing 
doctrine, even if they are not perfect guardians.316 
C. Broader Taxpayer Standing by Creating a Specialized Article I 
Court? 
Save for abandoning the rule against taxpayer standing, relying on 
state courts to challenge state tax credit policies on Establishment 
Clause grounds, or creating taxpayer standing by statute, Congress 
could try to confer taxpayer standing to bring Winn-type actions in an 
Article I court, such as the United States Tax Court, where Article III 
standing restrictions do not apply.317 Because these cases would 
 
conflict-averse nature of legislators, explaining that the “frequency of strategic avoidance 
and legislative gamesmanship suggests that legislators will generally be tempted to hide 
behind, rather than to contest, judicial interpretations of statutory law,” in the absence of a 
strong political demand otherwise). 
314 Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2288 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
315 Cf. BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS 
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 
343–46 (2009) (explaining how “judicial activism” has been made a pejorative by both 
liberals and conservatives). 
316 Cf. Benjamin N. Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARV. L. REV. 113, 113–14 
(1921) (“[T]he legislature, informed only casually and intermittently of the needs and 
problems of the courts, without expert or responsible or disinterested or systematic advice 
as to the workings of one rule or another, patches the fabric here and there, and mars often 
when it would mend.”). 
317 Congress has the power to confer jurisdiction on Article I courts like the U.S. Tax 
Court under the language of Article III, which vests the United States judicial power in the 
Supreme Court and the inferior courts that Congress has ordained and established. U.S. 
CONST. art. III, § 1. Indeed, non-Article III judges far outnumber their Article III 
counterparts, and include not only U.S. Magistrate Judges and administrative law judges, 
but also such courts as the Tax Court, bankruptcy courts, the Court of International Trade, 
and the Court of Claims, territorial courts, and the courts of the District of Columbia. For 
an excellent discussion of these specialized courts, see generally Rochelle Cooper 
Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication, 1990 BYU L. REV. 377 (1990). 
 Professors Krinsky and Elliott, among others, have also suggested resort to an Article I 
tribunal as a way for Congress to get around the vagaries of the general tripartite standing 
test. See David Krinsky, How to Sue Without Standing: The Constitutionality of Citizen 
Suits in Non-Article III Tribunals, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 301, 301–08 (2007); Elliott, 
Standing Problems, supra note 287, at 205–25; see also, e.g., James Dumont, Beyond 
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always involve review of government action, rather than citizen suits 
against a private party, various due process review concerns would 
not appear to threaten the legitimacy of the Article I court.318 Leaving 
aside the myriad political problems attending such a tribunal,319  could 
a statute conferring jurisdiction over Establishment Clause tax credit 
challenges to an Article I court be upheld as constitutional? 
Probably not. In Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. 
Schor, the Supreme Court warned that congressional attempts to 
transfer jurisdiction to non-Article III tribunals “for the purpose of 
emasculating” Article III courts will be invalidated.320 Central to the 
Court’s admonition was its description of the personal and structural 
purposes of Article III.321 The personal purpose—to safeguard 
 
Standing: Proposals for Congressional Response to Supreme Court “Standing” Decisions, 
13 VT. L. REV. 675, 684–89 (1989) (suggesting tribunal with narrow jurisdiction over 
environmental claims not meeting Art. III standing threshold). 
318 Here, I speak of the personal constitutional guarantees to judicial review by an 
impartial, independent Article III adjudicator. See, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 
50 (1932) (suggesting that where Congress creates an Article I tribunal, it is free to 
disregard such Article III guarantees if the case in question involves “public” rather than 
private rights); see also Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 
U.S. 50, 64–68 (1982). But see Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568 
(1985), in which the Court stated that “[a]n absolute construction of Article III is not 
possible in this area of frequently arcane distinctions and confusing precedents.” Id. at 583 
(internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, “practical attention to substance rather than 
doctrinaire reliance on formal categories should inform application of Article III.” Id. at 
587. The Court has also invoked consent of the parties as a basis for permitting the 
jurisdiction of non-Article III tribunals. See id. at 584; Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848–50 (1986). 
319 Such problems are beyond the scope of this Article. For an excellent discussion of 
them, see, e.g., Elliott, Standing Problems, supra note 287 at 211–14 (suggesting various 
factors which threaten the independence of non-Article III courts including, inter alia, no 
life tenure, fewer salary protections, and political pressure from the President, Congress, 
and agency heads, as well as litigation steering by powerful interest groups); see also 
Daniel J. Meltzer, Legislative Courts, Legislative Power, and the Constitution, 65 IND. L.J. 
291, 292 & n.7 (1990) (explaining how much easier it is to “stack” non-Article III courts 
than their Article III counterparts). While Professor Elliott believes that many of these 
factors can be solved or blunted, pressure from Congress may be insuperable. See Elliott, 
Standing Problems, supra note 287, at 214. 
320 478 U.S. 833, 850 (1986) (quoting Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Co., 337 U.S. 582, 
644 (1949) (Vinson, C.J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Court in 
Schor upheld an agency’s adjudication of a state law counterclaim that fell outside the 
scope of the statute the agency was charged with enforcing. Id. at 838–40. 
321 Whether the personal purpose is better understood as concern of the due process 
clause rather than Article III is beyond the scope of this Article. See, e.g., Crowell, 285 
U.S. at 86–88 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (insisting that due process was the exclusive 
source of the right to judicial review); Bator, supra note 2, at 267–68; Henry M. Hart, Jr., 
The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in 
Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1372–73 (1953). 
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litigants’ rights to have their claims decided by judges that are free 
from potential domination by the political branches322—was not 
violated in Schor because recourse to an Article III forum was waived 
by the litigants.323 However, the question of whether the alternative 
tribunal damaged the structural purpose of Article III—to protect “the 
role of the independent judiciary within the constitutional scheme of 
tripartite government”324—was more complicated, and required 
consideration of several factors. These included (1) “the extent to 
which the ‘essential attributes of judicial power’ are reserved to 
Article III courts, and, conversely, the extent to which the non-Article 
III forum exercises the range of jurisdiction and powers normally 
vested only in Article III courts”; (2) “the origins and importance of 
the right to be adjudicated”; and (3) the concerns that motivated 
Congress “to depart from the requirements of Article III” in the first 
place.325 
A statute conferring jurisdiction over Establishment Clause tax 
credit challenges to an Article I court would appear not to offend the 
personal purpose of Article III. Review of government action could 
take place in that tribunal,326 and the dissenting taxpayer could—and 
most likely would— consent to the jurisdiction of the Article I court if 
it promised adjudication of her Establishment Clause tax credit claim 
on the merits.327 Furthermore, because such actions are not 
cognizable in federal court under any formulation of the current 
 
322 Schor, 478 U.S. at 848 (citing United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 218 (1980)). 
323 See id. at 848–49 (holding that the “personal” right protected by Article III “is 
subject to waiver, just as are other personal constitutional rights that dictate the procedures 
by which civil and criminal matters must be tried”); see also Thomas, 473 U.S. at 584. 
324 Schor, 478 U.S. at 848 (quoting Thomas, 473 U.S. at 583). 
325 Id. at 851. 
326 See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932) (suggesting that where Congress 
creates Article I tribunal, it is free to disregard such Article III concerns if the case in 
question involves “public” rather than private rights); see also N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. 
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67–68 (1982) (holding that a bankruptcy court 
deciding a state-law contract claim violated Article III of the Constitution, but explaining 
that Congress could constitutionally assign to non-Article III tribunals “public rights” 
cases, or matters arising between individuals and the government “in connection with the 
performance of the constitutional functions of the executive or legislat[ure] . . . that 
historically could have been determined exclusively by those” branches (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
327 See supra note 323. On the other hand, the litigant might lack standing to forfeit the 
protections provided by Article III. Cf. Meltzer, supra note 319, at 304 (“Two 
Massachusetts residents cannot agree to federal court adjudication of their state law 
contract action because the states have an interest in federal non-interference that the 
litigants are unlikely to protect.”). 
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taxpayer standing doctrine,328 there is no claim to safeguard. Thus the 
rights of those dissenting, non-donating taxpayers to impartial 
adjudication would not be violated. 
Whether the statute would offend the structural purpose of Article 
III, however, presents a closer question. First, if limited to taxpayer 
challenges to tax credit programs like that in Winn, the Article I court 
would not, as a literal matter, exercise the broad “range of jurisdiction 
and powers normally vested only in Article III courts.”329 Nor, at first 
glance, would it appear to offend the “essential attributes of judicial 
power” reserved to Article III courts,330 as the Article I tribunal 
would be exercising jurisdiction over that which is unreviewable in 
federal court. However, if one of the essential attributes of judicial 
power is the constitutional case or controversy limitation,331 creating 
a tribunal solely to hear cases that Article III courts could not hear 
would certainly invite institutional critique. Concurrent jurisdiction 
between the two tribunals hearing taxpayer Establishment Clause 
claims would lead to simultaneous litigation and, in many cases, 
conflicting outcomes.332 And if the plaintiff lacked standing under 
Article III, any appeal of the Article I decision would raise a host of 
problems, not the least of which being that an Article III court would 
lack jurisdiction to hear a losing party’s claims.333 
Second, it might be argued that because “the origins and 
importance of the right to be adjudicated”334 in the tax credit cases 
are public in nature (i.e., created by statute) rather than a product of 
equity, admiralty, or the common law, there is no danger of 
encroachment upon the traditional judicial prerogatives of Article III 
 
328 See supra Parts II–III. The lone exception would be the standing to appeal adverse 
judgments recognized in ASARCO v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 618 (1989) (conferring Article 
III standing to intervening-defendants based on adverse judgment against them in state 
court, despite the fact that taxpayer-plaintiffs who initiated suit in federal court lacked 
standing). 
329 Schor, 478 U.S. at 851. 
330 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
331 See supra Part I.A. 
332 See Elliott, Standing Problems, supra note 287, at 215. 
333 See id. (suggesting that the Article III court would lack jurisdiction to hear the 
losing party’s claims from Article I tribunal if brought in the latter to avoid standing 
obstacles). The exception would be if the holding in Kadish could apply to the Article I 
tribunal, despite the potential for jurisdictional bootstrapping. See Kadish, 490 U.S. at 618 
(conferring Article III standing to intervening-defendants based on adverse judgment 
against them in state court, despite the fact that taxpayer-plaintiffs who initiated suit in 
federal court lacked standing). 
334 Schor, 478 U.S. at 851. 
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courts.335  However, if the origin of a claim is constitutional, and its 
remedy lies in equity, the public rights exception should not apply, 
particularly where, as in our case, such matters “historically could 
[not] have been determined exclusively by” the executive or 
legislative branches.336 If our hypothetical Article I tribunal would 
decide the constitutionality of tax credit challenges under the 
Establishment Clause, what power would it be exercising other than 
the “judicial Power of the United States”?337 Whether a challenged 
activity of the government violates the Constitution is not something 
over which the political branches have the final word. The availability 
of a judicial remedy for such a claim depends on Article III itself,338 
not the will of Congress.339 Accordingly, Congress could not 
constitutionally assign resolution of that claim to a non-Article III 
court.340 The Constitution assigns this task to the Judiciary alone.341 
 
335 Id. at 853; see also N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 
67–68 (1982). Compare Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2609 (2011) (“[W]e have long 
recognized that, in general, Congress may not withdraw from judicial cognizance any 
matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or 
admiralty.” (internal quotation marks omitted)), with id. at 2612 (explaining, on the other 
hand, that because Article I tribunal adjudication of public rights cases “depends upon the 
will of congress whether a remedy in the courts shall be allowed at all, so Congress could 
limit the extent to which a judicial forum was available” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
336 N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 67–68; see Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational 
Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 458 (1977) (extending public rights 
exception to cases “where the Government is involved in its sovereign capacity under . . . 
[a] statute creating enforceable public rights,” while “[w]holly private tort, contract, and 
property cases, as well as a vast range of other cases, are not at all implicated”). 
337 U.S. CONST. art III, § 1. 
338 U.S. CONST. art III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all cases . . . 
arising under this Constitution.”). 
339 Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co. (Murray’s Lessee), 42 
U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1855); see also Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 
54–55 (1989) (“If a statutory right is not closely intertwined with a federal regulatory 
program Congress has power to enact, and if that right neither belongs to nor exists against 
the Federal Government, then it must be adjudicated by an Article III court.”). 
340 U.S. CONST. art III, § 2, cl. 1; Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2609 (“Article III could neither 
serve its purpose in the system of checks and balances nor preserve the integrity of judicial 
decisionmaking if the other branches of the Federal Government could confer the 
Government’s judicial Power on entities outside Article III.”). Furthermore, the Supreme 
Court has continued “to limit the exception to cases in which the claim at issue derives 
from a federal regulatory scheme, or in which resolution of the claim by an expert 
government agency is deemed essential to a limited regulatory objective within the 
agency’s authority.” Id. at 2613. A challenge akin to Winn—which derives from the 
Establishment Clause and seeks declaratory and injunctive relief not provided by statute—
would not appear to fit this model. The “experts” at resolving such claims are the federal 
judiciary. Id. 
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Schor’s third structural purpose—”the concerns that drove 
Congress to depart from the requirements of Article III”342—also 
counsels against the constitutionality of the proposed Article I 
tribunal. When the legislative purpose in creating a tribunal outside 
Article III is to evade the limitations created by that Article for claims 
deemed justiciable by Congress but not the Supreme Court, the 
judicial power has been emasculated by the trivialization of its self-
imposed constitutional limitations.343 Furthermore, entrusting such 
claims to adjudicators beholden to the political branches not only 
jeopardizes doctrinal consistency,344 it ultimately weakens the 
primary structural value of Article III—adjudicatory independence.345 
This liberty-protecting, power-diffusing, and authority-checking 
aspect of Article III ensures that judicial decisions are rendered “not 
with an eye toward currying favor with Congress or the Executive, 
but rather with the ‘[c]lear heads . . . and honest hearts’ deemed 
‘essential to good judges.’”346 
Congress, it turns out, is no more likely than the Supreme Court to 
fill the tax credit standing hole in Establishment Clause cases. 
 
341 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2609 (“The Constitution assigns th[e] . . . resolution of ‘the 
mundane as well as the glamorous, matters of common law and statute as well as 
constitutional law, issues of fact as well as issues of law’—to the Judiciary.” (quoting N. 
Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 86–87 n.39)); see also THE FEDERALIST, Nos. LXXVIII–
LXXII (Alexander Hamilton) (H. Lodge ed., 1888). 
342 Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986). 
343 Id. at 850. For this reason, among others, Professor Elliott’s latest article 
(concerning the general standing doctrine) suggests that Congress would have more 
success creating an Article I tribunal “as part of a larger remedial scheme” than solely for 
the purpose of solving a perceived problem with the current standing doctrine. See Elliott, 
Standing Problems, supra note 287, at 222. 
344 See supra Part IV.B. 
345 Meltzer, supra note 319, at 300 (arguing that the “value most consistent” with the 
terms of Article III is “adjudication by tribunals free from the control of the federal 
political branches”); see also Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2608 (“‘[T]he “judicial Power of the 
United States” . . . can no more be shared’ with another branch than ‘the Chief Executive, 
for example, can share with the Judiciary the veto power, or the Congress share with the 
Judiciary the power to override a Presidential veto.’” (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 
U.S. 683, 704 (1974))). 
346 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2609 (quoting 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 363 (James 
DeWitt Andrews ed., 1896)). 
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CONCLUSION 
[D]issenting opinions are not always a reliable guide to the meaning 
of the majority; often their predictions partake of Cassandra’s 
gloom more than of her accuracy.347  
   —Judge Henry J. Friendly 
It is unusual for scholars or litigators who work in the 
Establishment Clause area to agree with what the Supreme Court has 
done to a doctrinal topic, particularly when that topic is standing. For 
that reason, I expect there to be resistance to this Article. However, I 
believe that, much like the traditional standing doctrine, the Court’s 
faithful courtship with the taxpayer version will continue, and 
jurisdictional restraint will be its defining characteristic. 
Winn, in this regard, is proof that the sky is not falling on Flast. 
Critics insisting otherwise, including the dissenters in Winn, advance 
arguments based on a faulty premise of what Flast protects and what 
the Winn majority actually said. To paraphrase Judge Friendly, they 
emphasize the gloom of the taxpayer standing doctrine but ignore 
Winn’s accuracy.348 Specifically, they exaggerate the reach of Winn 
by ignoring the heart of the injury in Flast, conflating the legal 
incidence of tax credits and government expenditures, overstating the 
potential for underenforcement of the Establishment Clause, and 
incorrectly assuming that the Flast exception applies to state 
taxpayers in federal court. 
Harm to a taxpayer’s conscience must be connected to his financial 
harm as a taxpayer in order to establish a sufficient injury for standing 
purposes. Flast’s normative test requires that an injured taxpayer 
plaintiff stirred by an otherwise generalized grievance make a 
showing that the type of congressional taxing and spending action he 
objects to takes from him to spend on religion.349 This test has found 
its place in modern standing jurisprudence and, barring a drastic shift 
in the Court’s makeup, it is here to stay.350 Accordingly, litigants and 
scholars should not expect the Court to abandon the rule against 
taxpayer standing; stare decisis makes such a result utopian.351 Nor 
should they expect Congress to create taxpayer standing by statute352 
 
347 Local 1545, United Bhd. Of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. Vincent, 286 F.2d 127, 
132 (2d Cir. 1960). 
348 Id. 
349 See supra Part I.B.3. 
350 See supra notes 22, 110–11. 
351 See supra Part IV.A; Pushaw, “Accidental” Plaintiffs, supra note 28, at 105. 
352 See supra Part IV.B. 
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or confer taxpayer standing to bring Establishment Clause challenges 
to tax credits in an Article I court.353 
Future scholarship and advocacy would be better spent determining 
whether—true to Justice Kagan’s prediction—Congress or state 
legislatures are in fact laundering direct financial aid to religion by 
using tax credits in lieu of direct appropriations.354 Careful thought, 
not blind optimism, must be given to which litigation strategies will 
best provide taxpayer plaintiffs the opportunity to challenge such 
enactments in state or federal court. In the interim, review of 




353 See supra Part IV.C. Litigants could, however, rely on state courts to challenge state 
tax credit policies on Establishment Clause grounds. See Zelinsky, Driver’s Seat, supra 
note 199, at 47–52. 
354 See Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1450–51, 1462–63 
(2011) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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